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ABSTRACT 
 
The Rise of Populist Rhetoric and the Mainstreaming of a Party?  
Testing the Rhetorical Shifts Between Front National’s Presidents Jean-Marie Le Pen and 
Marine Le Pen  
by 
Muriel C. McGregor 
 
Utah State University, 2019 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Steffen Blings 
Department: Political Science 
 
In France, the far right-wing party, Le Front National, has experienced recent 
growth in electoral success.  Scholars of the Front National have in part attributed the 
party’s success to its increased use of populist rhetoric, that is anti-elite sentiments, anti-
pluralist sentiments, and appeals to people.  This thesis delineated a definition of populist 
rhetoric and examined its use between the Front National’s past president Jean-Marie Le 
Pen (JMLP) and current president Marine Le Pen (MLP) in order to test these scholarly 
claims.  In particular, I tested three hypotheses: 1) the use of populist rhetoric by MLP 
compared to JMLP has experienced either no change or an increase; 2) the use of 
xenophobic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has experienced either no change or a 
decrease; and 3) the use of economic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has 
experienced no change or an increase.  Using an inductive mixed methods approach, I 
compiled a dictionary of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric. Then, using 
transcriptions of the party leaders' campaign speeches for the 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 
French presidential elections, I conducted a quantitative dictionary-based analysis on 
iv 
their use of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric.  For added nuance and to 
validate my quantitative results, I sampled a selection of the speeches to use for a 
qualitative content-based analysis.  My results showed that, contrary to scholarly claims, 
there has been only a relatively small increase in the use of populist rhetoric between 
JMLP and MLP.  This was due to MLP’s 2012 campaign; however, my inclusion of 
MLP’s 2017 exposed a return to levels of populist rhetoric use comparable to JMLP.  
Overall, I argue that the perceived increased use of populist rhetoric in the Front National 
has more to do with the saliency of populism than numerical fact.  
(96 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
The Rise of Populist Rhetoric and the Mainstreaming of a Party?  
Testing the Rhetorical Shifts Between Front National’s Presidents Jean-Marie Le Pen and 
Marine Le Pen  
Muriel C. McGregor 
 
 
Populist movements have been on the rise across Europe and the Americas.  In 
France, the far right-wing party, Le Front National, has experienced recent growth in 
electoral success. Scholars of the Front National have in part attributed the party’s 
success to its increased use of populist rhetoric.  This thesis examines the populist 
rhetoric used between the Front National’s past president Jean-Marie Le Pen and current 
president Marine Le Pen in order to test these scholarly claims.  Based on their campaign 
speeches for the 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 French presidential elections, I conducted a 
quantitative dictionary-based analysis on the difference in use of populist, xenophobic, 
and economic rhetoric between Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen.  My results show 
that there has been only a relatively small increase in the use of populist rhetoric between 
the two leaders.  Consequently, I argue that the perceived increased use of populist 
rhetoric in the Front National has more to do with the saliency of populism than 
numerical fact.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On April 21, 2002 Jean-Marie Le Pen - the President of the far right-wing party 
the Front National - won enough of the popular vote to boost him to the second round of 
the French presidential election.  Meanwhile, France’s establishment looked on aghast 
that extreme rhetoric intimating a right to difference, the return of the death penalty, and 
denial of the holocaust was apparently resonating with the French people.1  Fast-forward 
to France’s most recent presidential campaign in 2017 where the new president of the 
Front National - Marine Le Pen (daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen) - not only succeeded to 
the second round of voting, but emerged as a real contender to win.2  Her platform of 
economic protectionism, welfare chauvinism, combating illegal immigration, and 
criticizing the European Union attracted voters from across the board.3  
Part of the Front National’s rising success has been attributed to its use of 
populist rhetoric (see Gundogar 2013; Mondon 2016; Reynié 2011; Stockemer 2014; 
Wieviorka 2013; Williams 2011).  Indeed, news sources and scholars alike have 
increasingly associated the party with the right-wing populist movements sweeping 
across Europe and the United States (Galston 2018; Mondon 2015; Wodak 2013, 
2017).  Marine Le Pen has accepted the party’s rising affiliation with populism, casually 
                                                 
1 “Le Pen vote shocks France.” The Guardian. 22 April 2002. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/22/thefarright.france.  
2 “France's Le Pen turns far-right party into contender for power.” Reuters. 14 April 2017.  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-lepen-newsmaker/frances-le-pen-turns-far-right-party-
into-contender-for-power-idUSKBN17G18J. 
3 “Le programme de Marine Le Pen pour la présidentielle 2017.” L’Express. 11 April 2017.  
https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/elections/programme-marine-le-pen-presidentielle-
2017_1896717.html. 
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expressing that “Populiste? Le mot ne me gêne pas” [Populist? The word doesn’t bother 
me].4 
While the saliency of populism and its use among politicians has grown, the 
question emerges if the National Front has actually increased its populist 
rhetoric.  Currently, no Front National scholar has systematically tested if this rhetorical 
shift actually exists.  Several, however, argue that the populist repositioning of the party 
began under Jean-Marie Le Pen, prior to Marine Le Pen’s leadership (Mondon 2014; 
Gundogar 2013) - henceforth abbreviated as JMLP and MLP respectively.  In the 2007 
presidential election these efforts were greatly aided when the right-wing republican 
party candidate - Nicholas Sarkozy - explicitly coopted the FN’s stances on immigration 
and law and order as well as their burgeoning populist strategy (Mondon 2014).  Indeed, 
this allowed for the National Front’s viewpoints to enter the political mainstream.  As a 
counter to this view, though, other scholars claim that the party’s gradual move towards 
populism during the 2000’s was catalyzed by the rising National Front leaders - which 
included MLP - not JMLP (Stockemer 2014).  
In my thesis, I shed light on this debate by systematically measuring the populist 
rhetoric as well as the xenophobic and economic rhetoric in JMLP’s and MLP’s 
campaign speeches from the French 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 presidential 
elections.  The Front National offers a unique case in that it has only had two leaders 
since its inception; this allows for more rhetorical consistency over time as well as for 
easier isolation of any rhetorical shifts.  Indeed, as seen with the FN, far-right parties are 
                                                 
4 Note, all French translations in this paper are my own.  “Marine Le Pen « Populiste? Le mot ne me gêne 
pas ».” VSD. 9 November 2011. http://vsd.fr/les-indiscrets/18681-marine-le-pen-populiste-le-mot-ne-me-
gene-pas-4582.  
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often leader focused.  Consequently, leaders, as the most visible part of a party, 
communicate frames of reference – that is norms, values, and beliefs – with potential 
voters, shaping their perception of reality (Druckman 2001). This is often done through 
the vehicle of campaign speeches.  While political speeches are often multi-authored, it is 
the political speaker who owns their message and hence the impression they impart 
(Charteris-Black 2011).  
Through my research, I developed three dictionaries: one that measures populist 
rhetoric, one for xenophobic rhetoric, and one for economic rhetoric. I utilized these 
dictionaries to analyze JMLP’s and MLP’s campaign speeches; this formed the basis for 
my quantitative results.  My quantitative results give solid numbers on the use of 
populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric between JMLP and MLP as well as 
elucidate the scholarly debate as to the extent of the leader’s actual rhetorical 
differences.  Moreover, I created a descriptive coding scheme for the categorization of all 
three types of rhetoric.  I used this scheme to code a random selection of campaign 
speeches from both JMLP and MLP.  This formed the basis for my qualitative analysis. 
My qualitative analysis not only validates my quantitative results and provides context, 
but draws out the nuances of current scholarly claims.  The ultimate dataset I obtained on 
the populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric used by JMLP and MLP serves as the 
foundation for future analysis on the perception of the Front National and the use of 
populism.  While the instruments I used and results I derived are specific to the FN, my 
methods stand as a model for other researchers to follow in analyzing other far right-wing 
populist parties and their leader’s rhetoric.  
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In this thesis, I first define populism, followed by a discussion on far right-wing 
populist rhetoric, inclusionary and exclusionary populism, xenophobic rhetoric, and 
economic rhetoric.  Next, I briefly describe the Front National’s origin and evolution 
under JMLP.  Then, I review the current literature concerning the rhetorical shift between 
JMLP and MLP and propose three testable hypotheses.  I subsequently outline the 
methodology for my research and provide the results of my initial dictionary and coding 
pilot tests.  Next, I report the results of my quantitative and qualitative analyses.  Lastly, I 
test my data against my hypotheses and discuss the implications of my findings with 
respect to the scholarly debate.  
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POPULISM: A DEFINITION 
In order to form a basis for my dictionary on populist rhetoric, I first define 
populism. According to the frequently referenced definition by Mudde, populism is “a 
thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and 
which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people” 
(2004, p. 23).  This results in three foundational pillars of populism: 1) anti-elitism, 2) 
anti-pluralism, and 3) appeals to the people.  Moreover, populism frequently involves a 
charismatic leader, although it is not a requirement (Muller 2017; Van der Burg & 
Mughan 2007).  For the purposes of my research, I focus on and define the three pillars 
of populism.  With respects to the claim that populism is an ideology, further discussion 
is beyond the scope of this paper.  Do note, however, scholars range on their 
categorization of populism as a “thin-centered” ideology, a strategy, or a discursive style 
(for ideology see Freeden 1996; Stanley 2008; for strategy see Canovan 1999; Giraudi 
2018; Betz 2004; for discursive style see Moffit & Tormey 2014).   
For the first pillar of populism, anti-elitism references a disdain for the power held 
by the political class and administrative bureaucracy (Betz & Immerfall 1998).  Indeed, 
formal institutions and structures are seen as self-interested and unresponsive to public 
policy preferences (Galston 2017).  In turn, the second pillar of anti-pluralism grounds 
itself on the belief that “the people” are homogeneous and that their culture needs to be 
protected (Betz 2004; Galston 2017).  This connects with the ethnopluralist perspective 
which “considers different cultures to be equal, but distinct and thus incompatible” as 
well as nativist tendencies which perceive outsiders as a threat to the native culture 
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(Golder 2016, p. 480).  As for the last pillar, appeals to the people, this encompasses the 
idea that ordinary citizens house inherent “common sense” which lends them authority to 
make governmental decisions, often via referendum (Ignazi 2003, Betz & Immerfall 
1998, Mudde 2007).  Moreover, such appeals include attempts by politicians to stir 
people's anger, fears, and resentments (Betz 1994; Mondon 2014; Wodak 2015).  Do note 
that the literature defining appeals to the people is underdeveloped compared to the other 
two pillars of populism.  As a result, this pillar retains a degree of ambiguity to be filled 
by future research.  
For the purpose of my thesis, I chose to use Mudde’s definition for its concise 
articulation on the widely agreed elements of populism, namely anti-elitist and anti-
pluralist messages with the claim to be the voice of the silent majority.  The concentration 
on these features points to the heart of populism in action via rhetoric, rather than 
digressing into a theoretical discussion of its structure.  Moreover, both anti-elitism and 
anti-pluralism speak to the connection between populism and democracy.  That is when a 
democratic system is not sufficiently responding to its citizens, a spoken critique of the 
political administration is necessary in order to correct this disconnected representation 
(Canovan 1999; Giraudi 2018).  When people feel alienated - whether it be through 
ethnic competition, relative deprivation, or isolation5 - this can lead to a demand for 
change.  Parties can utilize their given political opportunity structure to address these 
concerns and increase electoral support (Eatwell & Mudde 2003; Rydgren 2007).  
There are two main strains of populism: inclusive and exclusive.  Inclusive and 
exclusive populism can be broken down into three dimensions: material, political, and 
                                                 
5 For further discussion on why people support far right-wing parties (i.e. demand side theories) see: Betz 
1994; Eatwell & Mudde 2003; Lucassen & Lubbers 2012; Kriesi et al 2006; and Rydgren 2007. 
7 
 
symbolic (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013).  Along these dimensions, inclusive populism 
targets specific groups to receive more state benefits, increase political participation, and 
be part of “the people”.  Exclusive populism, on the other hand, aims to prevent specific 
groups from receiving state benefits, often calling for a national preference system (also 
known as welfare chauvinism) where natives get preference in receiving state benefits 
(Rydgren 2004).  Moreover, exclusive populism attempts to stymie these same groups 
from engaging in the democratic process and from being considered part of “the people”.  
The motivations beyond exclusionary populist policies often stem from ethnocentrism - 
that is a preference for one's in-group, a sense of in-group superiority, and a desire to 
preserve one’s in-group cohesion (Bizumic & Duckitt 2012).  As a result, these policies 
are often targeted at ethnic minorities and foreigners.  Consequently, exclusive populism 
falls within the populist pillar of anti-pluralism.   
The two distinct strains stem from differing historical factors, ideological 
foundations, and geographical locations; namely, Latin America with inclusive and 
Europe with exclusive (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013).  In Europe populist parties are 
generally found exclusively on the far-right with ties to nativist and authoritarian 
ideologies.  Due to the association between Europe and exclusive populism, I focus on 
exclusive populism in my research and exclude further discussion of inclusive populism.  
However, a more expansive research project would merit a lengthened analysis of 
inclusive populism. 
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FAR RIGHT-WING POPULIST RHETORIC 
While Mudde's definition establishes the three pillars of populism, my research 
aims to hone in on populist rhetoric.  Since scholars have traditionally categorized the 
Front National as a far-right wing party, I delineate out far right-wing populist rhetoric in 
particular.  While the examination of scholarly debate surrounding what constitutes a far 
right-wing party is beyond the scope of this paper, I base my use of the word on the idea 
that a far right-wing party advocates for major societal changes – which veer from current 
policy consensus – through participation in democratic political institutions (Eatwell 
2000; Powell 1986). 
On its own, rhetoric is the “practical science and art of effective or efficient 
speaking and writing in public” (Abell et al. 2008).  Rhetoric conjoined with populism 
manifests as anti-elite and anti-pluralist sentiments with the claim that these opinions are 
representative of the people.  In particular, populist rhetoric distinguishes between the in-
group and the out-group(s) and creates a list of enemies.  These enemies include the 
political and economic elite as well as anything that threatens the in-group.  With respects 
to far right-wing populist parties, other enemies are frequently the progressive left, the 
media, ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, Muslims and Jews, ex-patriots, 
international organizations, and foreign countries (Mudde 2007, Chapter 3).  
Another feature of populist rhetoric is its various appeals grounded in the anti-
elite and anti-pluralist framework where people should be the basis of governmental 
decisions.  In far right-wing populism, these appeals manifest as an appeal to the common 
sense of the people against intellectual knowledge, an appeal to feelings of being 
exploited, an appeal to fears of disruption and insecurity, an appeal to the right to cultural 
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difference, and an appeal to national preference (Betz & Johnson 2016).  Moreover, these 
appeals are often presented in black and white options and/or as part of a conspiracy 
theory with specific moral stances and historical myths used to justify predetermined 
conclusions (Wodak 2015).  
Furthermore, far right-wing populist rhetoric is often used by a charismatic leader 
(Muller 2017; Van der Brug & Mughan 2007).  This translates into the leader using 
everyday plain language as way to make their message clear and relatable.  Indeed, 
charismatic populist politicians attempts to represent themselves as part of the people 
while at the same time claiming to be the solution.  Overall this creates a “double 
positioning as both the savior of the people and representing the people; and as being one 
of the people” (Wodak 2015, p. 127).  Savvy political leaders also use an element of 
performance when delivering populist rhetoric; however, analysis of this dimension is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
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XENOPHOBIC & ECONOMIC RHETORIC 
While my research’s main concern is in regards to measuring populist rhetoric 
between JMLP and MLP, the creation of dictionaries for both xenophobic and economic 
rhetoric provide additional insight into scholarly claims about the Front National.  As a 
result, I separate out each type of rhetoric into its own dictionary – that is populist, 
xenophobic, and economic – and further delineate subcategories for each type of rhetoric 
in order to achieve more granular measurement. 
Xenophobia is a “fear of individuals who are different or ‘strange’” (Rydgren 
2004, p. 158).  Xenophobic rhetoric, then, encompasses negative references to other 
ethnic identities (Pérez 2015), sometimes to the point of fear, hatred, and hostility (Watts 
1996), with a belief that people have an inherent right to live separately from these other 
ethnicities (Miles 1993).  Overt xenophobic rhetoric can be couched in terms of 
biological racism and ethnopluralist sentiments – that is the maintenance and/or 
establishment of ethnically separated regions as well as the preservation of one’s culture 
against homogenization (Betz 1994), called a right to difference or differentialism.   
On the milder side, exclusionary populist rhetoric – which encompasses attempts 
to prevent certain groups from receiving benefits or participating in the political process - 
can be seen in calls against immigration, for ultra-security policies, and in favor of 
national preference (Hainsworth 2004).  While the line between overt xenophobic 
rhetoric and exclusionary populist rhetoric is subjective, overt xenophobia is always a 
subset of exclusionary populist rhetoric while exclusionary populist rhetoric is always a 
subset of anti-pluralist rhetoric.  For a diagram showing the relationship between anti-
11 
 
pluralism, exclusionary populism, and xenophobic rhetoric, see Figure 1, Nested Anti-
Pluralism. 
 
Figure 1: Nested Anti-Pluralism 
 
In my analysis I separate out anti-pluralist, exclusionary populist, and overt 
xenophobic rhetoric into three categories.  I put words that are anti-pluralist only in a 
category under the umbrella of populist rhetoric.  Under xenophobic rhetoric, I put words 
that reference exclusionary populism in their own category and words that represent overt 
xenophobia in their own category.  Also of note, while exclusionary populist and overt 
xenophobia rhetoric are not limited to the far-right, far-right wing parties frequently 
utilize them (for further discussion on the link between xenophobia and far right-wing 
parties, see Betz 2003; Karapin 1998; and Kopeček 2007). 
I define economic rhetoric in politics as including statements about the nation’s 
growth, unemployment, wages, taxes, corporations, and trade.  More precisely, however, 
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a politician’s discussion of economics aims at appealing to voters by highlighting 
responsible parties and how, in turn, they can offer congruency or change (Anderson 
2000).   
Paired with right-wing populism, economic rhetoric advocates anti-globalization, 
protection of national businesses and native employment, and regulation of the financial 
elite (Betz & Immerfall 1998; Mudde 2007).  As a result, in my analysis, I separate out 
economic rhetoric into two categories: general economics and right-wing populist 
economics.   Moreover, since right-wing populist economic rhetoric encompasses 
regulation of the financial elite, it also overlaps with anti-elitism on this point.  
Consequently, words that reference finance and banking fall under both categories.   For 
a diagram showing the relationship between anti-elitism and right-wing populist 
economic rhetoric, see Figure 2, Venn Diagram Anti-Elitism & Right-Wing Populist 
Economics. 
 
Figure 2: Venn Diagram Anti-Elitism & Right-Wing Populist Economics 
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Overall, the relationship between populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric is 
complex.  Scholars do not agree on definitions for each type of rhetoric, nor are they able 
to set definite outlines of what each rhetorical category encompasses.  For my thesis, 
however, I have attempted to establish general boundaries for populist, xenophobic, and 
economic rhetoric in order to have a basis for quantitative measurement as well as to 
create a model for other researchers.  To visualize the relationship between populist, 
xenophobic, and economic rhetoric, along with their subcategories of appeals to the 
people, anti-pluralism, anti-elite, exclusionary populism, overt xenophobia, far-right wing 
populist economics, and the general economy, see Figure 3: Rhetoric Categories & 
Hypotheses.6    
Figure 3: Rhetoric Categories & Hypotheses 
  
                                                 
6 For a presentation and explanation of my hypotheses and how each rhetorical category relates to each 
hypothesis, see my section “Rhetorical Shifts Between JMLP and MLP” pages 20-22.   
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THE FRONT NATIONAL: BEGINNINGS AND EVOLUTION UNDER JMLP 
As detailed in the work of Delwit (2012), the Front National embodied a desire 
for radical right-wing politics to be seen as modern, forward-looking, and respectable.  
Founded in 1972 through a unification of several French neofascist/nationalist parties and 
with Jean-Marie Le Pen chosen to be its first president, the FN sought to democratically 
overthrow what it saw as a decadent regime under Georges Pompidou and protect against 
subversive communism.7   
In the 1980s8, as a “conservative revolution” began to take hold in Europe and the 
United States, the FN honed in on key issues like unemployment due to 
deindustrialization, the problems associated with immigrants, and the need to increase the 
French birth rate in order to maintain national identity.  As the party found its footing in 
the political arena, it specialized its message further to promote la préférence nationale 
[national preference] and immigration policy reform.  Moreover, during the 1988 
presidential election, JMLP paid particular attention to his image as well as his platform, 
landing him 4th place in the first round of voting and contributing to the FN’s success in 
the legislative elections that year.  Gradually, a pattern began to emerge for the Front 
National’s voter base: male, young to middle aged, non-practicing Catholic or non-
religious, and blue-collar worker.9 
                                                 
7 Delwit organizes FN history into four stages.  This beginning phase - la traversée du désert - spans from 
1972-1983 as outlined in pages 11-18 
8 Delwit titles this phase “L’enracinement et la consolidation du Front National”, which spans from 1983-
1999, pages 18-29.   
9 While the Fromt National was originally associated with the Catholic Church – due to support from 
prominent Catholic conservatives, such as the archbishop Marcel Lefebvre –, the party’s link to Christian 
values has more to do with France’s history as a Catholic nation, nationalist sentiments being linked to that 
history, and the association of nationalism with the far-right.  For further discussion on the development of 
the FN voter base, called ouvriéro-lepensisme, see pages 24-25. 
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However, the party received bad press throughout the early 1990s after JMLP 
made several anti-Semitic and racist statements.10  The party became further stigmatized 
when it declared opposition to the Maastricht Treaty – the impetus for the creation of the 
EuroZone.  The National Front feared that a merging of economies would destroy 
France’s sovereignty, national identity, and overall patriotism.  At the same time, the key 
enemy of the party – the Soviet Union – collapsed.  Another setback came when the 
party’s délégue général [executive officer] Bruno Mégret split to create his own party in 
1998 after JMLP refused to “normalize” the party’s rhetoric as well as to concede his 
position as the party’s president.11 
Despite voter polls showing that the Front National was viewed as “racist, 
sectarian, and incapable of governing” (Shields 2007, p. 247), the party experienced a 
resurgence in the mid-1990s.  Unemployment was on the rise as were crime rates.  
Moreover, a large number of immigrants were moving into France creating new social 
tensions.  In 1995, JMLP launched another presidential campaign.  He ran on a platform 
calling for job creation, national preference, repatriation of certain immigrants, phasing 
out of income tax, and the reestablishment of the death penalty.  In the subsequent 
presidential election of 2002, JMLP unexpectedly made it to the second round of voting, 
launching the party to greater visibility.12   
                                                 
10 In particular, JMLP’s mitigation of the Holocaust and Bruno Mégret’s “immigration policy” which called 
for the repeal of anti-racist legislation, the expulsion of unemployed immigrants, and the ban on places of 
worship foreign to French identity. 
11 JMLP declared “The National Front was founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen, led by him for twenty-five years 
[...] there isn’t any reason why this should stop.”  Meanwhile, Bruno Mégret first introduced the strategy of 
dédiabolisation - or dedemonization - for the party.  The term was later rebirthed when MLP became party 
president. 
12 The next phase in FN history, l’essoufflement (constriction), encompasses 2000-2011.  See Delwit 2012, 
p. 29-36. 
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Gradually, however, once loyal party voters drifted toward the center-right, in 
particular in the 2007 presidential election of Nicolas Sarkozy.  Moreover, voting laws 
had changed in 2004 from a regional proportional representative system to majoritarian 
one, drastically decreasing FN seats in key areas of support.  A growing sense emerged 
among party leadership that its image needed to become more mainstream.  The radical 
element of its rhetoric needed to be eliminated and replaced with political correctness and 
modern values.  In her 2010 bid to become the new President of the FN, Marine Le Pen 
promised to do just that with her dédiabolisation [de-demonization] strategy - compared 
to her competitor Bruno Gollnisch who remained steeped in historical negationism and 
ties to conservative Catholic stances.  After winning the vote to become the party’s new 
President, MLP boldly declared that the Front National was not a far right-wing party, 
but a party for France and the French people.13 
  
                                                 
13 The last phase, la renaissance possible, gives an overview of the initial changes and potential obstacles 
for the party under MLP’s leadership. 
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RHETORICAL SHIFTS BETWEEN JMLP AND MLP 
Scholars of the Front National vary on when they claim that the party shifted its 
rhetoric toward populism; however, the claim that there has been a shift is 
widespread.  Originally, the FN was considered to be a far-right political party under 
JMLP.  Indeed, the party embraced the idea that it was an outsider with “priorités 
radicalement différentes” [radically different priorities] (Shields 2011).  JMLP was seen 
as a charismatic politician; his stretch as party president, however, also included several 
faux pas which tarnished the FN’s image (Williams 2011).  While the National Front is 
still considered to be on the political right, MLP, as party president, has restructured its 
image around her professional and personal charisma (Gundogar 2013; Mayer 
2013).  Indeed, she has declared “Je suis la candidate de la révolte populaire face au 
système, de la vérité face au mensonge” [I am the representative of the popular revolt 
against the system, of the truth in the face of lies].14 
Only one systematic analysis has been done comparing JMLP to MLP.  Alduy 
and Wahnich (2015) looked at 500 texts – public speeches, editorials and radio and TV 
interviews – by Jean-Marie and Marine from 1987-2013.  They used linguistic software 
to ascertain lexical frequency, concordance, semantic networks, word clouds, textual 
environment, key words, themes, proper names, neologisms, grammatical categories as 
well as to compare their findings with normative reference language.  In the end, they 
conclude that “Marine Le Pen n’a pas fondamentalement altéré le logiciel de pensée 
frontiste : sa version en actualise la présentation et le vocabulaire, non le fond 
                                                 
14 Marine Le Pen: ‘Je suis la candidate de la révolte populaire.’” 17 February 2012. Le Parisien. 
http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-politique/marine-le-pen-je-suis-la-candidate-de-la-revolte-
populaire-17-02-2 
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idéologique” [Marine Le Pen has not fundamentally altered the program of Frontist 
thought: her version only updates its presentation and its vocabulary, not its ideological 
foundation]. 15 
Three other authors have conducted qualitative analyses.  Gundogar (2013) 
describes how JMLP used populist rhetoric, but came to represent outdated concerns and 
policy solutions – such as communism and repatriation of immigrants – as France’s 
contextual factors changed.  MLP, then, in turn, utilized her political abilities along with 
capitalizing on updated issues in order to rebrand the party.  Mayer (2013) completed a 
structured case study of JMLP and MLP.  She argues that MLP capitalized on the 
populist trend that was already underway during JMLP’s leadership.  Williams (2011) 
looked at both lateral and source factors behind recent FN success.  She concludes that 
JMLP and MLP are both charismatic leaders who used catch-all strategies; however, 
while mistakes made by JMLP hindered the party, MLP does not have such baggage to 
weigh her down.  
Several other scholars have honed in on MLP’s rhetoric alone.  Baider (2015) 
looked at MLP’s rhetoric from 2011-2015.  In particular, he looked at words that were 
specifically used by the FN as well as looked at the context surrounding the use of 
emotion words; he concluded that such words embodied a sense of 
protectionism.  Bastow (2018) argues that overall the Front National under MLP is 
ideologically similar to that under JMLP’s leadership.  The only difference is that MLP 
has toned down controversial language and put more emphasis on the economy following 
similar European populist movements.  Goodliffe (2016) discusses the party’s reimaging 
                                                 
15 Alduy & Wahnich 2012, p. 116. 
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of itself via dédiabolisation [de-demonization].  He notes MLP’s increased economic and 
republican rhetoric while toning down radical rhetoric.  Stockemer (2014) claims that the 
National Front has always used a degree of populist rhetoric; MLP just strove to bring it 
to the forefront.  Mondon (2014) acknowledges that much of what has led to MLP’s 
success was laid by her father.  However, the crux to her rise was Sarkozy’s cooptation of 
FN stances which allowed them to enter the mainstream.  Since then, MLP has been able 
to jump on the populist resurgence.   
Overall, FN scholars note that JMLP used xenophobic, exclusionist, and racist 
rhetoric.  Indeed, he appealed to conservative morality and harsh justice.  On the other 
side, MLP has toned down such language, instead focusing on her relatability to people 
as well as appealing to their common sense.  She sets herself up as the defender of French 
sovereignty and values such as laïcité [secularism] – that is the separation of religion 
from the civic sphere.  She openly accepts abortion, homosexuality, and civil 
unions.  Moreover, MLP appeals to the sense of exploitation among people by the 
establishment, in particular criticizing the European Union, corporatism, and 
globalization.  However, both JMLP and MLP capitalized on crises, creating lists of 
enemies – most prominent being immigrants – that they argue threatened French security 
and identity.  Based on my review of the literature, I have combined various scholarly 
claims concerning the rhetoric used by MLP compared to JMLP as well as where they 
overlap into a chart (see the Appendix, p. 69). 
Clearly, there has been a rhetorical shift between JMLP and MLP, in particular 
with regards to the perception that MLP uses populist rhetoric.  However, there has been 
no systematic analysis of this claim, merely observations.  While Alduy and Wahnich 
20 
 
(2015) conducted a comprehensive comparison of JMLP and MLP, they did not 
specifically analyze populist rhetoric and only included MLP’s rhetoric up to 2013.  The 
qualitative studies by Gundogar (2013), Mayer (2013), and Williams (2011) provide 
insight into the reasons behind a populist rhetorical shift, but fail to quantitatively back 
up their assumption that such a shift has occurred.  Likewise, their research does not 
include MLP’s more recent rhetoric.  More contemporary analyses of MLP’s rhetoric 
alone make pertinent observations; however, they lack structured analysis as well as fail 
to provide solid comparison to JMLP.  Ultimately, this gap merits a quantitative analysis 
on the populist rhetoric of JMLP and MLP to establish first if a shift has occurred and 
second if the shift hinged on a change in leadership or constitutes a linear trajectory.  
From the literary debates, three broad camps emerge concerning the degree to 
which JMLP used or did not use populist rhetoric as compared to MLP – that is the 
semantic camp, the dédiabolisation camp, and the bandwagon camp.  While these camps 
overlap in many respects, I have divided them for a more thorough discussion.  First, the 
semantic camp claims that there has been no foundational change to MLP’s populist 
rhetoric as compared to JMLP, merely updating.  Next, the dédiabolisation camp argues 
that there has been a concentrated effort by MLP to decrease controversial ideas 
promoted by JMLP and increase discussion of more mainstream issues.  Lastly, the 
bandwagon camp implies that MLP has jumped on board with populist rhetoric 
movement in order to better appeal to voters but hasn’t necessarily sought to deradicalize 
its rhetoric.  Moreover, several scholars add in the variables of xenophobic and economic 
rhetoric, arguing that there has been a decrease in the former and an increase in the 
latter.  While the different FN scholars do not all directly address the question concerning 
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populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric and whether there has been a change or not, 
I have drawn on their articles to create three testable hypotheses.   
For Hypothesis 1, the use of populist rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has 
experienced either a) no change or b) an increase.  Alduy & Wahnich, Mayer, Stochemer, 
Williams argue there has been no change.  This perspective is linked to semantic camp as 
well as the dédiabolisation camp.  Indeed, this stems from the idea that MLP uses similar 
populist rhetoric as JMLP but has sought to deradicalize the party by eliminating extreme 
rhetoric and mainstreaming the party by focusing on economic rhetoric.  Bastow, 
Goodliffe, Gundogar, Mondon argue there has been an increase.  This is founded on the 
bandwagon camp which argues that MLP is trying to expand the party base and 
consciously use the populist label.  
For Hypothesis 2, the use of xenophobic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has 
experienced either a) no change or b) a decrease.  According to Alduy & Wahnich, there 
has been no change, merely word replacement.  This falls into the semantic camp.  
Bastow, Gundogar, Goodliffe, Mayer, Mondon, Stockemer, and Williams argue there has 
been a decrease.  This position originates in the dédiabolisation strategy of the party and 
desire to become more mainstream. 
For Hypothesis 3, the use of economic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has 
experienced either a) no change or b) an increase.  Alduy & Wahnich, Bastow, Gundogar, 
Goodliffe, Mayer, and Williams argue there has been an increase.  For Alduy & 
Wahnich, this stance comes from their quantitative analysis which found that MLP 
referenced economic terms more than JMLP.  For those in the dédiabolisation camp, it 
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derives from MLP’s attempt to mainstream.  Mondon and Stockemer do not specifically 
comment on economic rhetoric.  
I have organized these hypotheses in the Table 1 – Hypotheses: 
Table 1 - Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
Populist Rhetoric 
Hypothesis 2 
Xenophobic Rhetoric 
Hypothesis 3 
Economic Rhetoric 
The use of populist rhetoric 
by MLP compared to 
JMLP has experienced:  
H1a) No change 
H1b) An increase 
The use of xenophobic 
rhetoric by MLP compared 
to JMLP has experienced: 
H2a) No change 
H2b) A decrease 
The use of economic 
rhetoric by MLP compared 
to JMLP has experienced: 
H3a) No change 
H3b) An increase 
 
For my research I test these three hypotheses by quantifying the populist rhetoric 
as well as xenophobic and economic rhetoric used by JMLP and MLP in their campaign 
speeches.  To do this, I break each type of rhetoric into subcategories with lists of words 
representative of each category.  The quantitative data I obtain clarifies whether the use 
of populist rhetoric by the FN is genuinely new or if the populist rhetoric stands out due 
to the reduction in xenophobic rhetoric and the augmentation of economic 
rhetoric.  Overall, this is a needed analysis not only to settle scholarly debate, but also to 
provide insight into the connection between the Front National’s success and use of 
populist rhetoric.  Moreover, my findings will be able to be applied to research on other 
far right-wing populist leaders and their appeal. 
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METHODOLOGY 
In order to provide insight into the use of populist rhetoric under JMLP and MLP 
as well as its potential increase under MLP along with a decrease in xenophobic rhetoric 
and increase in economic rhetoric, I conducted an inductive mixed methods research 
project using a dictionary-based analysis on all campaign speeches and a content-based 
analysis on a random selection of campaign speeches.  In comparison to the qualitative 
work done by several other Front National scholars (Almeida 2013; Bastow 2018; 
Goodliffe 2016; Gundogar 2013; Mayer 2013; Mondon 2014; Shields 2013 & 2014; 
Stockemer 2014; Williams 2011), a dictionary-based analysis provided for systematic 
review and tangible results on broader trends.  A content-based analysis allowed me to 
validate my qualitative results.  I was able to take into account context, catch false 
positives, as well as identify nuances other scholars have not yet addressed. These 
methods enabled me to test the assertion as to whether MLP has increased the use of 
populist rhetoric compared to JMLP and to lay the groundwork for future research on the 
connection between the use of populist rhetoric and mainstream electoral acceptance.  
In the research conducted by Alduy and Wahnich, they compiled and organized 
the public speeches, editorials, radio, and TV interviews for both JMLP and MLP from 
1987-2013.16  For the purpose of my research, I used their list of the campaign speeches - 
found under discours - from 2002, 2007, and 2012.  For MLP’s 2017 campaign speeches, 
I found them on the FN’s website - found under discours de Marine Le Pen.  I define 
campaign speech as verbal rhetoric in which a candidate discusses their platform 
pertaining to the position they seek in an open forum in front of an electorate 
                                                 
16 The complete list can be found at https://decodingmarinelepen.stanford.edu/corpus.  
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audience.  First, this eliminates any written rhetoric.  Second, it distinguishes different 
types of possible speech, in particular that presented in a press conference to the media 
and/or a one-on-one interview with a varied viewership.  My definition of campaign 
speech provides an isolated connection between the political leader and the potential 
voter.   
For each speech, I obtained videos and/or French transcriptions from the Front 
National’s website17 (now the Rassemblement National), Youtube, and an open access 
public speech database compiled by the French Office of Legal and Administrative 
Information18.  For the video speeches that did not have an accompanying transcription, I 
transcribed them.  There were three speeches for JMLP and four for MLP, for a total of 
seven speeches, for which I was unable to find a video or a transcription.  I excluded 
these speeches from my analysis.  I do not believe this exclusion contains systematic bias, 
as they were completely random exclusions due merely to their lack of availability on the 
internet.  There were three speeches entitled voeux or voeux à la presse [press 
conferences] – one from JMLP from 2002 and two from MLP from 2012 – listed under 
discours on the decodingmarinelepen.com website.  I excluded these from my analysis as 
they are press greetings and do not fit my definition of campaign speech.  From the 
speeches I obtained from the Front National’s website, there were five speeches which I 
excluded from my analysis.  One was a video message, not a campaign speech.  Two 
were actually press conferences.  One was a questions and answer in a closed meeting.  
The last one was a speech given outside of France in Chad to the Chadian parliament.  In 
the end, for JMLP from 2001-2002, there is a total of 13 speeches.  For JMLP from 2006-
                                                 
17 See https://www.rassemblementnational.fr/.  
18 See and http://www.vie-publique.fr/.  
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2007 there is a total of 27 speeches.  For MLP from 2011-2012 there is a total of 23 
speeches.  For MLP from 2016-2017 there is a total of 37 speeches.  In all, there is a total 
100 speeches.  For a list of all speeches organized by campaign, see the Appendix, p. 70-
78. 
Before beginning my analysis of the campaign speeches, I ran two pilot tests to 
lay the groundwork for my dictionary-based and content-based analyses.  I removed the 
speeches used for my pilot tests from the final sampling.  For the first test I randomly 
selected one speech from each campaign, for a total of four speeches.19  From each 
speech, I compiled an n-gram dictionary of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric.  
Here n represents the total number, while gram represents words.  Thus, my n-gram 
dictionary constitutes one, two, three, etc. word sequences.  In the end, the largest portion 
of my dictionary n-grams were one word with the largest n-gram being three words.  
When determining what word phrases were populist, I based my selections on 
Mudde’s definition of populism – that is anti-elitism and anti-pluralism with an appeal to 
the people.  For anti-elite words, I selected words that represented political and elite 
classes.  For anti-pluralist words, I honed in on words that embody a unified people and 
cultural protection.  For appeals to the people words, I found words that represented 
justified emotions and citizenry power.  Examples of each category include words like 
Bruxelles [Brussels] which is anti-elite because it is where the European Union 
Headquarters are located, société française [French society] which falls under anti-
                                                 
19 Speeches Used: 
JMLP: 1) March 3, 2002, Lille, Discours de Lille Meeting and 2) November 12, 2006, Le Bourget, 
Discours du Bourget.  
MLP: 1) February 26, 2012, Val-de-Loire, Discours de Châteauroux and 2) April 9, 2017, Ajaccio, 
Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Ajaccio. 
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pluralism because of its idealization of a homogenous culture, and colère du peuple 
[anger of the people] which is an appeal to the people through its assumption that 
ordinary citizens are right in this feeling. 
For xenophobic rhetoric, I created two categories: exclusionary populism and 
overt xenophobia.  For exclusionary populism, I chose words that aimed to prevent 
groups from 1) receiving state benefits, 2) engaging in the democratic process, and 3) 
being considered part of “the people”.  This encompassed exclusionary measures such as 
barrière [barrier].  For overt xenophobia, I selected words that embodied a negative 
reference to other ethnic identities, at times inciting fear, hatred, and hostility, with a 
belief that people have an inherent right to live separately from these other ethnicities.  
This included ethnic words like beur [a child of North African immigrants] as well as 
inciting words like invasion [invasion].  For both my populist and xenophobic rhetoric 
words, I also utilized Alduy’s (2017) breakdown of words used by major French 
politicians, in particular the chapter on MLP20, in her most recent book just prior to the 
French 2017 presidential elections.  
For economic rhetoric, I split into two categories: general economy and right-
wing populist economic.  For the general economy, I selected words like chômage 
[unemployment] as well as used the economic word dictionary already created by Alduy 
and Wahnich (2015)21 in their analysis.  For the right-wing populist economic category, I 
chose words that encompassed anti-global sentiments - such as mondialism sauvage 
[unbridled globalism] - and protectionist perspectives - like patriotisme économique 
[economic patriotism]. 
                                                 
20 See Alduy 2017, p. 115-162. 
21 See Alduy & Wahnich 2015, p. 34-41. 
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When necessary, I stemmed certain words - that is remove the word end to reduce 
it to its base root - in order to streamline searchability.  As I went through the speeches, I 
adjusted my dictionary by removing outliers and overly general words so as to hone in on 
the desired speech to measure (Grimmer & Stewart 2013).  In order to cross check and 
increase the robustness of my dictionary, I also used the programmes des candidats á la 
présidentielles [candidate platforms]22 from both JMLP and MLP from each election to 
derive more n-grams.  I choose the programmes présidentiels in particular for their direct 
relation to the campaign speeches in my analysis and similar target audience as well as 
for their systematic and bulleted organization.   
The results of my first test are as follows: 
1) Populist Rhetoric 
a. Anti-elite total words: 57 
b. Anti-pluralist total words: 59 
c. Appeal to people total words: 10 
2) Xenophobic Rhetoric 
a. Exclusionary populism total words: 29 
b. Overt xenophobia total words: 22 
3) Economic Rhetoric 
a. General economy total words: 68 
b. Right-wing populist economics total words: 41 
 
These results are the dictionary for my dictionary-based analysis.  For a complete list, see 
the Appendix, Table 8 - Rhetoric Dictionary.  
For the second test, I created a coding scheme using descriptive codes – a word or 
phrase that summarizes the overall concept of a short passage in a text (Saldaña 
                                                 
22 Programmes Présidentielles (also see the Appendix, p. 70): 
JMLP: 1) April 2002, Programme de M. Jean-Marie Le Pen, http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/023001406.html and 2) March 2007, Programme électoral de Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001250.html.  
MLP: 1) January 2012, Programme de Mme Marine Le Pen, http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/123000632.html and 2) April 2017, 144 Engagements Présidentiels, 
https://rassemblementnational.fr/pdf/144-engagements.pdf.   
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2015).  The foundation for my descriptive codes comes from my research on populism, 
populist rhetoric, and far-right wing parties (Betz & Immerfall 1998, 2004, 2016; Golder 
2016; Mudde 2007; Wodak 2015). On top of that, I drew from my readings of populist 
right-wing scholars (Mudde 2007; Wodak 2015) and the creation of my dictionary, such 
as the need for a far-right wing populist economics category.  Next, I read through one 
randomly selected campaign speech in order to hand code the document according to my 
scheme.  As I hand coded, I made any necessary adjustments to the scheme in order to 
better reflect key concepts.  I also noted any encapsulating quotes.   
Based on my reading, my initial coding scheme included the overarching 
categories of democracy, list of enemies, appeals, charismatic leader, economy, and 
phrasing.  These categories included various subcategories like 1) the party represents the 
will/voice of the people, 2) political elite, 3) exploitation, 4) plain language, 5) anti-
globalization, and 6) black and white options. After creating my dictionary, however, I 
realized that the larger categories did not address the focus of my hypotheses, namely 
populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric.  Moreover, the analysis of a charismatic 
leader is currently beyond the scope of my research.  As a result, I revised the categories 
to the following: 
1) Anti-elitism 
2) Anti-pluralism 
3) Appeal to people  
4) Exclusionary populism 
5) Far-right wing populist economics 
6) Phrasing  
 
For the new categories I added, subcategories included concepts like 1) political elite, 2) 
French identity, 3) national preference, and 4) economic patriotism. I adjusted some of 
the subcategories while I was coding.  For example, I delineated several more types of 
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appeals to the people.  This coding scheme is the base for my content-based analysis.  For 
the entire coding scheme, see the Appendix.  
As I coded the speech, some rhetoric fit cleanly into a category and 
subcategory.  For example, a reference against multiculturalism fell under anti-pluralism.  
Other rhetoric fit into the same category and multiple subcategories within that category, 
such as appeals that spoke to a sense of exploitation and a loss of control.  A few sections 
fit into multiple categories like references that were anti-elite in nature while also 
critiquing their relation to France’s economic situation.  I did not find examples of all 
subcategories I listed in this particular speech. This most likely is not an issue because it 
is possible for a concept to not occur in every case example.  Overall, my coding scheme 
adds value to my analysis by allowing me to better catch all relevant dimensions, in 
particular context.  Having a better sense of the context around my dictionary words 
enables me to cross-check their validity.  Moreover, a qualitative analysis provides 
insight into the attribute of a charismatic leader associated with populist rhetoric.  While I 
am not testing this in my thesis, it may prove valuable for future research. 
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RESULTS 
In my results section, I lay out the procedures used in my dictionary-based 
quantitative analysis and content-based qualitative analysis.  Next, I provide the data 
obtained in my dictionary-based analysis of each set of campaign speeches, incorporating 
my content-based qualitative analysis to provide context.  Then, I test my three 
hypotheses, comparing JMLP’s sets of campaign speeches against MLP’s.  Lastly, I 
discuss and analyze my findings in terms of the broader scholarly debate. 
 
Dictionary-based Quantitative Analysis & Content-based Qualitative Analysis 
For my dictionary-based quantitative analysis, using the content analysis software 
Yoshikoder, I first uploaded my dictionary.  Next, I uploaded a text document for each 
campaign which contained all the speeches.  I ran a report for each category in my 
dictionary.  This provided me with an overall count of how many times the words in that 
category were found in the speeches as well as the proportion of those words compared to 
other words not being measured.  I then ran a concordance to obtain an alphabetical list 
of the words from my dictionary found in the speeches.  This provided an exact count of 
the use of each word in each category as well as the passage around each word.  
As I ran through my initial analysis I needed to refine broader stem words such as 
mondial* [world/globe] and nation* [nation] in order to refine results.  In several 
categories, I pinpointed false positives.  For example, in the anti-elite category, the stem 
liber* resulted in the word liberté [liberty].  This was a word I specifically excluded from 
my dictionary due to its generalizability in French political parlance.  As a result, I 
replaced the stem liber* with the exact words I aimed to hit, such as libéral and libéraux 
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[liberal].  Another example is in the exclusionary populist category; the stem ferm* 
resulted in the word ferme [farm].  Consequently, I narrowed the search to the specific 
words fermer [to close] and fermeture [closure].  In the category of general economy, the 
main results for the stem libéralis* [to liberalize] resulted in right-wing populist 
economic contexts.  Consequently, I moved that stem search from the general economy 
category to the right-wing populist economics category.  
In the presentation of my results, I provide the percentage total for the use of each 
rhetorical category in relation to each set of campaign speeches.  The percentage allows 
for a measurement of the number of times the rhetoric was used in relation to the 
whole.  Then, I list the top three most frequently used words along with their percent 
usage for each category in order to hone in on the most prominent themes found in each 
set of campaign speeches.    
For the content-based analysis, I randomly selected two speeches from each 
campaign, ensuring that the speeches were from diverse dates and locations.23  I then read 
through each speech and coded passages according to my coding scheme.  As I coded 
passages, most encompassed several sub-categories.  For example, a passage by MLP 
referenced the category of anti-elitism with the sub-category of economic elite, the 
category of appeal to the people with the subcategories of sense of exploitation and 
patriotism/sovereignty, and the category of far-right wing populist economics with the 
subcategory of economic patriotism.  For other passages, I had difficulty determining the 
exact subcategory they fell under.  For example, a discussion about immigration 
                                                 
23 See the Appendix, p. 70-78, for a list of speeches delineated out by campaign.  
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contained underlying tones of the subcategories fear of disruption and insecurity and loss 
of control.  For such instances, I coded the phrase as containing both subcategories.  
 
JMLP Campaign Speeches 2001-2002 Analysis Results 
For JMLP’s 2001-2002 campaign speeches, 42.37% of the rhetoric coded for this 
project was populist, with a breakdown of 11.86% anti-elite, 28.95% anti-pluralist, and 
1.56% appeal to people.  Within the anti-elite category, out of a total 197 word count, the 
top three most frequently used words were finac* [such as financier (financial)] (18.7%), 
socialis* [for example socialiste (socialist) and socialisme (socialism)] (15.2%), and a tie 
between Bruxelles [Brussels] and américain [American] (both 8.6%).  JMLP’s frequent 
reference to socialism falls in line with scholarly claims (see Hainsworth 2004) about his 
virulent anti-communism.  According to my coding scheme, under the subcategory of 
foreign country, JMLP heavily emphasized and criticized American influence on Europe 
and France. For example, he states that: 
Since France has renounced its national sovereignty, it no longer has control 
over its political or military policy, both of which have been conceded to the 
United States through the European Union which it controls through Germany, its 
closest ally.24  
Within the anti-pluralist category, out of a total 481 word count, the top three 
most frequently used words were national* [for example nationalisme (nationalism)] 
(32.8%), nationalité [nationality]* (10.1%), and souverain* [such as souveraine 
(sovereign) and souveraineté (sovereignty)] (9.9%).  These results correspond to 
                                                 
24 « La France ayant renoncé à être une nation souveraine n'a plus de politique étrangère ni de politique 
militaire, l'une et l'autre, étant désormais concédées aux Etats-Unis, à travers l'Union Européenne qu'ils 
contrôlent par l'Allemagne, leur alliée la plus sûre ».  JMLP, 2001, 18 August, La Trinité-sur-mer, 
Discours de La Trinité sur mer meeting. 
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scholarly observations about JMLP’s frequent references to the fatherland and 
traditionalism (see Hainsworth 2004).  According to my coding scheme, under the sub-
categories of French identity, protection, and patriotism/sovereignty, JMLP proclaims 
that:  
Here is the stigmatization technique used on patriots: it is the technique 
according to which any valorization of traditions and the Nation is immediately 
suspected of Hitlerian sympathy, which one will suggest directly, or more 
skillfully, by speaking for example about a speech about control of migratory 
flows as a discourse ‘that brings us back to the darkest hours of our history’. [...] 
We must preserve the sovereignty of France.25  
 
Within the appeal to the people category, out of a total 26 word count, there were 
only two words used: responsabilité [responsibility] (53.8%) and référend* [referendum] 
(46%).  While mentioned by some scholars, these results highlight that JMLP sought to 
utilize a method that is seen as key to populism: referendum.  According to my coding 
scheme, under the sub-category of referendum, JMLP proposes that: 
In order to loosen the grip and effectively respond to the shadow of tyranny, we 
must use targeted and intelligent mechanisms of direct democracy, such as 
referendum.26   
 
For xenophobic rhetoric, there was a total of 26.54%.  15.71% of the rhetoric was 
in the exclusionary populist category.  Out of a total 261 word count, the top three most 
frequently used words were étrang* [such as étranger (foreign) and étrangère 
(foreigner)] (29.5%), sécurité [security] (18.7%), and immigré [immigrant] (9.1%).  
10.83% of the rhetoric was in the overt xenophobia category.  Out of a total 180 word 
                                                 
25 « Les techniques de stigmatisation des patriotes : c'est la technique selon laquelle toute valorisation des 
traditions et de la nation est immédiatement suspectée de sympathie hitlérienne, ce que l'on suggérera 
directement, ou plus habilement, en parlant par exemple d'un discours de contrôle des flux migratoires 
comme d'un discours ‘qui nous ramène aux heures les plus sombres de notre histoire’. [...] Il faut préserver 
la souveraineté de la France.» JMLP, 2002, 21 February, Paris, Discours de Paris colloque. 
26 « Pour desserrer l'étau et répondre efficacement à cette tyrannie de l'ombre, il faut utiliser d'une manière 
ciblée et intelligente les mécanismes de démocratie directe tels que le référendum ». Ibid. 
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count, the top three most frequently used words were terror* [such as terrorisme 
(terrorism)] (30%), fondamental* [like fondamentalisme (fundamentalism)] (12.7%), and 
danger [danger] (7.7%).  However, the words islam* [for example Islam and Islamic] and 
musulman* [Muslim] were both close behind at 7.2%.  This agrees with scholarly 
statements that JMLP used xenophobic rhetoric and, in particular, expressed anti-
immigration views (see Goodliffe 2016, Hainsworth 2004, and Reynie 2011).  According 
to my coding scheme, under the sub-category of immigration, JMLP points out that 
uncontrolled immigration leads to the disintegration of French Republican values, 
unemployment, urban ghettos, increased government spending, and insecurity.  He 
declares that: 
Today’s immigration challenges our concept of the Republic (multiculturalism 
versus unity), our concept of education (the Islamic headscarf versus secularism), 
our concept of the family (polygamy versus monogamy), and our concept of 
women’s rights (excision versus respect for women).27 
 
For economic rhetoric, there was 31.05% with a breakdown of 25.64% general 
economy and 5.41% right-wing populist economics.  Within the general economy 
category, out of a total 426 word count, the top three most frequently used words were 
économ* [for example économie (economy) and économique (economic)] (19.9%), a tie 
between chôm* [for example chômage (unemployment) and chômeur (unemployed)] and 
développ* [to develop] (both 7.9%), and retraite [retirement] (6.8%).  Within the right-
wing populist economics category, out of a total of 90 word count, the top three most 
frequently used words were agric* [such as agricole (agricultural), agriculture 
                                                 
27 « L'immigration d'aujourd'hui met donc notamment en cause notre conception de la République 
(multiculturalisme contre unité), notre conception de l'école (foulard islamique contre laïcité), notre 
conception de la famille (polygamie contre monogamie) et notre conception de la femme (excision contre 
respect de la femme) ». JMLP, 2002, 21 February, Paris, Discours de Paris colloque. 
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(agriculture), and agriculteurs (farmers)] (48.8%), rétabl* [to restore] (15.5%), and 
mondialisation [globalization] (11.1%).  While scholars agree that JMLP used economic 
rhetoric – many do not mention it –, the use of anti-globalist and pro small business 
sentiments are largely attributed to MLP (see Goodliffe 2016, Mondon 2015, and 
Williams 2011).  According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of anti-
globalization and political/economic elite, JMLP vents that: 
With the Euro, our economy, our agriculture, and our jobs will escape our 
control.  We will become a people of helots, delivered defenseless to the New 
World Order, of which the federalist Europe is nothing but a stage and a cover.28 
Overall, JMLP’s 2001-2002 campaign speeches largely focus on an anti-pluralist 
message surrounding the preservation of the French nation, its culture, and its sovereignty 
against globalization.  Indeed, he emphasizes the need for increased security against 
outsiders. He also calls for the development of France’s economy as well as reduction of 
the unemployment rate and preservation of retirement benefits.  Figure 4 shows a 
comparison of the percentage of each rhetorical category in JMLP’s 2001-2002 campaign 
speeches.29   
 
  
                                                 
28 « Par l'Euro, notre économie, notre agriculture, nos métiers échapperont à notre volonté. Nous 
deviendrons un peuple d'ilotes, livré sans défense au Nouvel Ordre Mondial dont l'Europe fédérale n'est 
qu'une étape et une couverture ». JMLP, 2001, 18 August, La Trinité-sur-mer, Discours de La Trinité sur 
mer meeting. 
29 For a list of top frequently used words by category in JMLP’s campaign speeches from 2001-2002, see 
the Appendix, p. 86. 
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Figure 4: Percentage of Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric in JMLP Campaign Speeches 
2001-2002 
 
 
 
JMLP Campaign Speeches 2006-2007 Analysis Results   
For JMLP’s 2006-2007 campaign speeches, there was a total of 44.95% populist 
rhetoric with a breakdown of 17.28% anti-elite, 25.63% anti-pluralist, and 2.02% appeal 
to people.  Within the anti-elite category, out of a total 555 word count, the top three most 
frequently used words were finac* [finance] (20.1%), Sarkozy (14.9%), and Bruxelles 
[Brussels] (13.1%).  The significant use of the word Sarkozy is to be expected, as Nicolas 
Sarkozy was the main opposing candidate in the election.  According to my coding 
scheme, under the sub-category of international organization, JMLP bemoans the control 
that international organizations have over French sovereignty.  He claims that: 
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For over twenty years, the French people have sacrificed their ability to decide, 
their political freedom, their sovereignty all for the benefit of Brussels, in the 
hope that they would obtain additional resources and services for the future, all 
without realizing that our powers, our freedoms, and our liberties entrusted to 
Brussels were immediately squandered by the European Commission for the 
benefit of the World Trade Organization, the United States, the free trade zones of 
the global market, in which we are politically, economically, and socially 
crushed.30 
Within the anti-pluralist category, out of a total 823 word count, the top three 
most frequently used words were national* [national] (28.9%), justice [justice] (9.5%), 
and defend* [to defend] (5.46%).  The word femme* [women] was close behind at 5.3%.  
This corresponds with scholarly claims that JMLP frequently emphasized the need for 
law & order (see Mondon 2014 and Williams 2011), which was to be obtained via 
righteous justice such as the death penalty.  According to my coding scheme, under the 
sub-categories of French identity, protection, patriotism/sovereignty, and historical myth, 
JMLP argues that:  
In order to save our trusted values, because they alone allow for life and 
sometimes happiness, we must fight to save their foundations, solidified 
throughout our History, which have allowed us to preserve our liberties, our 
independence, our security, our culture and our identity through difficult 
struggles.31  
 
Within the appeal to the people category, out of a total 65 word count, there were 
only three words used: responsabilité [responsibility] (61.5%), référend* [referendum] 
                                                 
30 « Les Français ont donc sacrifié, pendant vingt ans, leur pouvoir de décider, leur liberté politique, leur 
Etat au profit de Bruxelles, en espérant obtenir ainsi un supplément de force, de services, d'avenir, sans 
s'apercevoir que nos pouvoirs, nos libertés et notre argent ainsi confiés à Bruxelles étaient immédiatement 
dilapidés par la Commission européenne au profit de l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce, des Etats-
Unis, d'un marché commun planétaire construit à coup de zones de libre-échange emboîtées, dans lequel 
nous sommes politiquement, économiquement et socialement broyés ». JMLP, 2007, 25 March, Toulouse, 
Discours de Toulouse. 
31 « Pour sauver les valeurs auxquelles nous sommes attachés, parce qu'elles seules permettent la vie et 
parfois le bonheur, nous devons combattre pour sauver les structures, vérifiées par l'Histoire, qui ont 
permis au travers de douloureux combats, de préserver nos libertés, notre indépendance, notre sécurité, 
notre culture et notre identité ». JMLP, 2006, 22 October, Vendée, Discours aux Herbiers. 
38 
 
(32.3%), and populis* [populist; populism] (6.1%).  This is the first explicit use of the 
words populisme and populist by JMLP.  This speaks to the arguments of few scholars 
which claim that the populist trajectory of the Front National began under JMLP 
(Gundogar 2013; Mondon 2014). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-
categories of common sense and referendum, JMLP declares that: 
If I am elected, from here on, I solemnly commit to adding an article to the 
French Constitution which requires any modification of the European Treaties to 
be subject to compulsory consultation of the French people via a referendum.32 
For xenophobic rhetoric, there was a total of 18.41%.  13.83% of the rhetoric was 
exclusionary populist.  Out of a total 444 word count, the top three most frequently used 
words were sécurité [security] (19.5%), étrang* [foreign] (14.6%), and immigré* 
[immigrant] (10.1%).  The word lutt* [to fight] was not far behind at 8.1%.  For overt 
xenophobia, there was a total 4.57%.  Out of 147 words, the top three most frequently 
used words were fondamental* [fundamental] (22.44%), with a tie between insécurité 
[insecurity] (10.8%), musulman* [Muslim] (10.8%), and terror* [terrorist; terrorism] 
(10.8%), closely followed by violence [violence] (9.5%).  These results uphold the 
scholarly view that JMLP’s message was anti-immigration with xenophobic undertones 
(Hainsworth 2004; Williams 2011).  According to my coding scheme, under the sub-
category of immigration, JMLP criticizes France’s acceptance of large numbers of 
immigrants.  He rails that: 
                                                 
32  Je m'engage dès maintenant, solennellement, si je suis élu, à ajouter à la Constitution française un 
article disposant que toute modification des Traités européens fasse l'objet d'une consultation obligatoire 
du peuple français par la voie du référendum ». JMLP, 2007, 25 March, Toulouse, Discours de Toulouse. 
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Meanwhile, the floodgates of mass immigration have been opened, the state has 
continued to spread its generosity to the benefit of people from around the 
globe.33 
For economic rhetoric, there was a total 36.63% with a breakdown of 29.00% 
general economy and 7.63% right-wing populist economics.  Within the general economy 
category, out of a total 931 word count, the top three most frequently used words were 
économ* [economy] (16.4%), entrepr* [business; entrepreneurs] (9.9%), and chôm* 
[unemployment] (7.8%).  Within the right-wing populist economics category, out of a 
total of 245 word count, the top three most frequently used words were agric* 
[agriculture] (42.8%), rétabl* (to restore) (23.6%), and both a tie at 11.0% between 
mondialisation [globalization] and global* [global].  These results do not drastically 
differ from JMLP’s 2001-2002 campaign speeches which speak to relative scholarly 
silence on the matter.  According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of anti-
globalization and loss of control, JMLP asserts that: 
To continue down this path that systematizes ultra-free trade, which is rooted in 
the suicidal overvalued euro, which contributes to the disappearance of our 
agricultural and industrial sectors and leaves us no choice but to raise taxes to 
hire new officials, continue on in this way, it's actually taking us on a one-way 
trip to the Middle Ages!34 
Overall, the focus of JMLP’s 2006-2007 campaign speeches remain similar to that 
of his previous campaign - that is largely comprised of anti-pluralist sentiments and 
discussion of France’s general economy.  His use of anti-elite words increased by 5.42%.  
In particular, his criticism of the United-States decreases and is replaced by criticism 
                                                 
33 « Entre temps, les vannes de l'immigration de masse ont été ouvertes, l'Etat n'a cessé de répandre ses 
générosités au bénéfice de populations issues des quatre coins du globe ». Ibid. 
34 « Continuer dans une voie qui systématise l'ultra libre-échangisme, qui enracine le suicidaire euro 
surévalué, qui organise notre disparition agricole et industrielle et ne nous laisse d'autres choix que 
d'augmenter les impôts pour embaucher de nouveaux fonctionnaires, continuer dans cette voie, c'est 
effectivement, prendre un aller simple vers le Moyen-âge ». Ibid. 
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against Nicolas Sarkozy.  His use of various anti-pluralist words remains even, with the 
exception of the word justice going from 4.7% in the 2001-2002 campaign to 9.5% 
usage.  Most notably, JMLP’s overall xenophobic rhetoric decreases since his last 
campaign, in particular his use of overt xenophobia drops by 6.2%.  Figure 5 shows a 
comparison of the percentage of each rhetorical category in JMLP’s 2006-2007 campaign 
speeches.35 
 
Figure 5: Percentage of Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric in JMLP Campaign Speeches 
2006-2007 
 
 
MLP Campaign Speeches 2011-2012 Analysis Results 
                                                 
35 For a list of top frequently used words by category in the JMLP’s campaign speeches from 2006-2007, 
see the Appendix, p. 86. 
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For MLP’s 2011-2012 campaign speeches, there was a total of 52.41% populist 
rhetoric with a breakdown of 24.86 % anti-elite, 26.36 % anti-pluralist, and 1.19% appeal 
to people.  Within the anti-elite category, out of a total 813 word count, the top three most 
frequently used words were Sarkozy (20.4%), finac* [finance] (18.5%), and 
(banq*/banc* [bank; banking] (11.8%).  The use of Hollande was not far behind at 7.5%.  
The high use of Sarkozy and Hollande corresponds to them being the main opposing 
candidates in the election.  It also speaks to the scholarly observation that MLP 
frequently scapegoats – in this instance the blame falls on her opponents – and aims to 
present herself as outside the box of the political elite (Mondon 2014; Shields 2013; and 
Stockemer 2014).  According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of 
economic elite and sense of exploitation, MLP directly criticizes those in the economic 
sector who she sees as exploiting the French people.  She argues: 
Moreover, when you put a ballot in the ballot box, are you really choosing 
between several candidates or is the only choice for us that of our master?  You 
have the choice: BNP Paribas, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs [...] this financial and 
banking oligarchy, which gives itself a permanent golden parachute, vacations 
and indecent bonuses, but it is from our pockets that it draws endless money. 36 
 
Within the anti-pluralist category, out of a total 862 word count, the top three 
most frequently used words were national* [national] (22.0%), defend* [to defend] 
(9.1%), and valeur* [value] (8.7%).  The word patriot* [patriot] was close behind at 
8.0%.  These results agree with scholarly claims that MLP emphasizes and seeks to 
defend that traditional values of the French Republic (Bastow 2018; Goodliffe 
                                                 
36 « D'ailleurs, en mettant un bulletin dans l'urne, choisit-on vraiment encore entre plusieurs candidats ou 
nous reste-t-il comme seul choix celui de notre maître. Vous avez le choix : BNP Paribas, JP Morgan, 
Goldman Sachs [...] cette oligarchie financière et bancaire, qui s'auto-attribue en permanence parachute 
doré, retrait de chapeau et bonus indécents, mais c'est dans notre poche qu'elle puise sans fin son argent ». 
MLP, 2012, 7 April, Lyon, Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Lyon. 
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2016).  According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of French identity, 
patriotism/sovereignty, and economic patriotism, MLP declares that:   
My friends, we no longer believe in their old utopias of a prosperous, powerful, 
united and fraternal European Union.  We no longer believe in their evil 
European Soviet Union.  We, my friends, believe in economic patriotism and 
social patriotism. We believe in our national identity.  We believe in national 
solidarity.  We believe in the genius of our civilization, courage, work, merit, 
talent, righteousness, honor, freedom.  We, my friends, believe in France.37 
 
Within the appeal to the people category, out of a total 39 word count, there were 
only three words used: responsabilité [responsibility] (53.8%), référend* [referendum] 
(38.4%), and populis* [populist; populism] (7.7%).  This falls in line with scholarly 
observations that MLP seeks to appeal to the common sense of her base (Gundogar 2013; 
Mondon 2014).  According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of common 
sense and future vision, MLP calls the French people to action.  She proclaims that: 
With you, I will make decisions that will disrupt the establishment.  With you I 
will make decisions on Europe, immigration, economic and social policy.  With 
you I will take immediate and concrete measures to influence prices, improve the 
purchasing power of retirees, civil servants, employees, workers, and the 
unemployed.38  
 
For xenophobic rhetoric, there was a total 17.79%.  12.72% of the rhetoric was 
exclusionary populist.  Out of a total 348 word count, the top three most frequently used 
words were étrang* [foreign] (18.6%), immigration [immigration] (16.9%), and sécurité 
                                                 
37 « Mes amis, nous ne croyons plus à leurs vieilles utopies d'une Union Européenne prospère, puissante, 
solidaire et fraternelle. Nous ne croyons plus à leurs méchante Union Soviétique européenne. Nous, mes 
amis, nous croyons au patriotisme économique, au patriotisme social. Nous croyons à notre identité 
nationale. Nous croyons à la solidarité nationale. Nous croyons au génie de notre civilisation, au courage, 
au travail, au mérite, au talent, à la droiture, à l'honneur, à la liberté. Nous, mes amis, nous croyons en la 
France ». Ibid. 
38 « Avec vous, je prendrai des décisions en rupture avec le désordre établi. Avec vous je prendrai des 
décisions sur l'Europe, l'immigration, la politique économique et sociale. Avec vous je prendrai des 
mesures immédiates et concrètes pour peser sur les prix, pour améliorer le pouvoir d'achat des retraités, 
des fonctionnaires, des salariés, des ouvriers, des chômeurs ». Ibid. 
43 
 
[security] (15.8%).  For overt xenophobia, there was a total 234 word count.  The top 
three most frequently used words were insecurité [insecurity] (17.0%), with a tie 
between islam* [Islam; Islamic] (15.3%) and violence [violence] (15.3%), followed by 
fondamental* [fundamental] (7.7%).  The increased use of Islam corresponds with 
scholar assertions that MLP attacks it as incompatible with Republican values (Mondon 
2015; Reynie 2011).  Moreover, these results are consistent with the acknowledgment 
that MLP calls for immigration control (Goodliffe 2016; Reynie 2011).  According to 
my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of immigration and loss of control, MLP 
contends that:  
The French have conquered the system of generous social protection in 
principle, but this system is threatened. It is threatened by immigration; it is 
threatened by social fraud; some will say the two are linked, they are partially 
right, but only partially. Admittedly, France does not welcome all the misery of 
the world, but it already welcomes way too much.39  
 
For economic rhetoric, there was a total 29.78% with a breakdown of 23.24% 
general economy and 6.54% right-wing populist economics.  Within the general economy 
category, out of a total 760 word count, the top three most frequently used words were 
économ* [economy] (14.2%), entrepr* [business; entrepreneur] (12.7%), and chôm* 
[unemployment] (11.8%).  Within the right-wing populist economics category, out of a 
total of 214 word count, the top three most frequently used words were agric* 
[agriculture] (36.9%), mondialisation [globalization] (18.6%), and rétabl* [to restore] 
(14.4%).  These results agree with scholarly claims that MLP calls for financial 
                                                 
39 « Les français ont conquis un système de protection sociale généreux dans son principe, mais il est 
menacé. Il est menacé par l’immigration ; il est menacé par la fraude sociale ; les deux sont liés diront 
certains, pour une part ils ont raison, mais pour une part seulement. Certes, la France n’accueille pas 
toute la misère du monde, mais elle en accueille déjà beaucoup trop ». Ibid. 
44 
 
regulation, opposes big banks, and focuses on small French businesses (Bastow 2018; 
Goodliffe 2016; and Shields 2013).  However, they do not significantly differ from the 
economic rhetoric results for JMLP.  According to my coding scheme, under the sub-
categories of disaffected (small-medium businesses, working class, rural areas) and 
national industry, MLP advocates that: 
At all times, in all places, I want to support audacity, I want to repair the 
injustice, I want to encourage the entrepreneurial spirit, I want to help job 
creation where it is, that is to say among our artisans, our young entrepreneurs, 
our very small businesses, our small and medium-sized businesses who fight to 
exist every day.40 
 
Overall, MLP’s 2011-2012 campaign message emphasizes anti-elite and anti-
pluralist sentiments along with a discussion of France’s general economy.  For instance, 
she rails against the political and economic elite, that is Nicolas Sarkozy, François 
Hollande, and big banks.  Moreover, she envisions the restoration and preservation of 
French culture as well as national sovereignty.  Indeed, she emphasizes the insecurity and 
violence caused by immigration and fundamental Islamism.  Her discussion of the 
economy encompasses a desire to shrink the power of the financial/banking sector, 
support and grow small and medium-sized French businesses, and decrease 
unemployment.  Figure 6 shows a comparison of the percentage of each rhetorical 
category in MLP’s 2011-2012 campaign speeches.41    
  
                                                 
40 « En tout temps, en tous lieux, je veux soutenir l'audace, je veux réparer l'injustice, je veux encourager 
l'esprit d'entreprise, je veux aider la création d'emplois où elle se trouve c'est-à-dire chez nos artisans, nos 
jeunes entrepreneurs, nos très petites entreprises, nos PME [applaudissements] qui chaque jour se battent 
pour exister ». Ibid. 
41 For a list of top frequently used words by category in MLP’s campaign speeches from 2011-2012, see the 
Appendix, p. 86-87. 
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Figure 6: Percentage of Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric in MLP Campaign Speeches 
2011-2012 
 
 
 
MLP Campaign Speeches 2016-2017 Analysis Results 
For MLP’s 2016-2017 campaign speeches, there was a total of 40.36% populist 
rhetoric with a breakdown of 11.29% anti-elite, 27.41% anti-pluralist, and 1.66% appeal 
to people.  Within the anti-elite category, out of a total 557 word count, the top three most 
frequently used words were financ* [finance] (24.2%), banq*/banc* [bank; banking] 
(15.0%), and administrat* [administration] (9.3%).  The words Hollande (8.6%) and 
Bruxelles [Brussels] (8.0%) were close behind.  The high use of Hollande corresponds to 
him being the incumbent president.  Moreover, the frequency of references to banks 
corresponds to scholarly assertions that MLP has increased her economic discourse, in 
particular emphasizing her opposition to entities like the European Union and the 
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European Central Bank (Gundogar 2013; Shields 2013).  Moreover, these results adhere 
to MLP’s appeals of exploitation by the establishment (Mondon 2014).  According to my 
coding scheme, under the sub-categories of political and economic elite, MLP makes 
several comments as follows:  
The power that ancients called ‘auctoritas’, that is the power to issue rules, has 
been transferred to a foreign authority based in Brussels.42  
 
The powers of money have only won further power under François Hollande, 
perhaps advancing more slyly than before, but they are trying to take total 
power.43 
 
Within the anti-pluralist category, out of a total 1352 word count, the top three 
most frequently used words were national* [national] (20.2%), patriot* [patriot; 
patriotism] (9.7%), and cultur* [culture] (7.7%).  Words like democrat* [democracy] 
(7.3%), defend* [to defend] (7.1%), and souverain* [sovereignty] (7.1%) were not far 
behind.  These results are consistent with scholarly declarations that MLP presents 
herself as the defender of France and its values (Goodliffe 2016; Mondon 2015), and that 
she seeks to restore national sovereignty.  According to my coding scheme, under the 
sub-categories of immigration, border security, and fear of disruption and insecurity, 
MLP emphasizes the need to restore national borders, stating that: 
The mishandled management of migratory flows, both legal and illegal, have led 
to the flooding of our country and the destabilization of entire parts of our 
territory.44 
 
                                                 
42 « Le pouvoir que les anciens dénommaient « l’auctoritas », c’est-à-dire le pouvoir d’édicter des règles a 
été transféré à une autorité étrangère basée à Bruxelles ». MLP, 2017, 27 February, Nantes, Discours de 
Marine Le Pen à Nantes. 
43 « Les forces de l’argent n’ont fait que gagner en puissance sous François Hollande, avançant peut-être 
plus sournoisement qu’auparavant, mais elles tentent de prendre un pouvoir total ». Ibid. 
44 « Le laisser-aller en matière de gestion des flux migratoires, légaux comme illégaux, aboutit à la 
submersion de notre pays et la déstabilisation de parties entières du territoire ». MLP, 2017, 27 February, 
Nantes, Discours de Marine Le Pen à Nantes. 
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Within the appeal to the people category, out of a total 82 word count, there were 
only two words used: référend* [referendum] (76.8%) and responsabilité [responsibility] 
(23.1%).  This represents a dramatic increase in the reference to référendum as compared 
to the previous sets of campaigns speeches, both from JMLP and MLP.  While MLP does 
not explicitly use words like populisme, she highlights the need for the people of France 
to make their voice heard.  These results align with scholarly assertions that MLP not 
only seeks to appeal to the common sense of the French people, but also that this is best 
done via direct democracy (Goodliffe 2016).  According to my coding scheme, under the 
sub-categories common sense and referendum, MLP remarks that:  
But in the end who will decide? It is you who will decide in the end on the 
occasion of the referendum that I will organize at the end of this discussion, at the 
end of this negotiation. Nothing will be done without you; nothing will be done 
against you.45 
 
For xenophobic rhetoric, there was a total of 26.21%.  14.17% of the rhetoric was 
exclusionary populist.  Out of a total 699 word count, the top three most frequently used 
words were sécurité [security] (20.6%), immigration [immigration] (19.1%), and 
étrang* [foreign] (18.8%).  For overt xenophobia, there was a 594 word count.  The top 
three most frequently used words were islam* [Islam; Islamic] (27.1%), terror* 
[terrorism] (22.8%), and fondamental* [fundamental] (17.0%).  Compared to her 2011-
2012 campaign, MLP greatly increased her use of islam* words by 11.8%.  These results 
further back scholarly claims that MLP attacks multiculturalism and Islam (Mondon 
2015; Reynie 2011).  However, they question the argument as to whether MLP has toned 
                                                 
45 « Mais au final qui déciderait ? C'est vous au final qui déciderez à l'occasion du référendum que 
j'organiserai au terme de cette discussion au terme de cette négociation. Rien ne se fera sans vous ; rien ne 
se fera contre vous ». MLP, 2017, 28 April, Nice, Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Nice. 
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down anti-immigration and exclusionist sentiments or not.  According to my coding 
scheme, under the sub-categories of laïcité [secularism] and fear of disruption and 
insecurity, she critiques that:  
The permissiveness that allows the principle of secularism to be trampled on 
under the guise of pluralist religion allows the ideological provocations from 
Islamism to proliferate in canteens, in hospitals, in the streets, on the beach, and 
in companies.46 
 
For economic rhetoric, there was a total 33.41% with a breakdown of 27.93% 
general economy and 5.47% right-wing populist economics.  Within the general economy 
category, out of a total 1378 word count, the top three most frequently used words were 
econom* [economy] (24.8%), entrepr* [business; entrepreneur] (16.6%), and chôm* 
[unemployment] (7.5%).  Within the right-wing populist economics category, out of a 
total of 270 word count, the top three most frequently used words were agric* 
[agriculture] (25.5%), with a tie between mondialisation [globalization] and rétabl* (to 
restore) (24.8%), and followed by global* [global] (11.4%).  These results maintain that 
MLP use economic discourse, in particular emphasizing anti-globalization sentiments, 
economic patriotism, and pro small businesses (Goodliffe 2016; Mondon 
2015).  However, they disagree with scholarly claims that MLP has seen an increase in 
economic rhetoric.  According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of 
patriotism/sovereignty, anti-globalization, and national industry, MLP declares that: 
Monetary and economic sovereignty allows us to act directly in the service of our 
economy, serving our businesses, very small businesses and small and medium-
sized businesses, without having permission to ask anyone.  It gives us weapons 
again globalization, as all sovereign nations are doing; it permits us to adjust our 
                                                 
46 « Le laxisme qui laisse bafouer le principe de laïcité sous couvert de religion multiplié laisse se 
multiplier les provocations idéologiques de la parte d’islamisme dans les cantines, dans les hôpitaux, dans 
les rues, sur la plage, et dans les entreprises ». Ibid. 
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economy as needed rather than lowering wages or destroying our social 
protection system.47 
 
Overall, MLP’s 2016-2017 campaign speeches see the continuation of anti-
pluralist and general economic rhetoric, with a significant decrease in anti-elite words 
(13.5%) followed by an increase in exclusionary populism (3.5%) and overt xenophobia 
(4.8%).  For anti-elite sentiments, MLP continues to criticize the established political 
administration and the financial sector.  While her percentage reference to finance 
increases by 5.7% as compared to her previous campaign, her references to political 
opponents decrease.  With anti-pluralist rhetoric, she emphasizes the need to defend the 
French nation and its culture against globalization and the powers that wish to take away 
its economic and political sovereignty.  In particular, with xenophobic rhetoric, she hones 
in on the dangers of Islamism and illegal immigration.  In regards to the general 
economy, MLP’s message remains the same as in her previous campaign; indeed, she 
persists in decrying globalization and calls for the restoration of France’s control over its 
economy.  Figure 7 shows a comparison of the percentage of each rhetorical category in 
MLP’s 2016-2017 campaign speeches.48   
  
                                                 
47 « La souveraineté monétaire et économique qui nous permet d’agir directement au service de notre 
économie, au service de nos entreprises, TPE et PME, sans avoir de permission à demander à quiconque, 
qui nous donne des armes dans la mondialisation, comme le font tous les pays souverains, qui nous permet 
d’ajuster notre économie autrement que par la baisse des salaires ou la destruction de notre système de 
protection sociale ». MLP, 2017, 27 February, Nantes, Discours de Marine Le Pen à Nantes. 
48 For a list of top frequently used words by category in MLP’s campaign speeches from 2016-2017, see the 
Appendix, p. 87. 
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Figure 7: Percentage of Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric in MLP Campaign Speeches 
2016-2017 
 
 
 
 
Hypotheses Test & Comparison of JMLP and MLP 
In testing my three hypotheses49 with my data for the four sets of campaign 
speeches, the overall results are seen below in Figure 8 which plots the change in the 
percentage usage of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric over time between 
JMLP’s and MLP.  The results of the categories contained within each kind of rhetoric 
are seen below in Figure 9.   Figure 10 shows a comparison of the percentage of usage of 
each category of rhetoric between JMLP’s and MLP’s sets of campaign speeches.  In my 
comparison of the difference between the three rhetorical categories between JMLP and 
                                                 
49 See Table 1 – Hypotheses, p. 22.  
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MLP, I hold an increase or decrease of 5% as a notable shift. I chose this threshold due to 
the minimal instances of an increase or decrease greater than 5% between JMLP and 
MLP.  For a less than 1% increase or decrease, I consider this as no change.  
 
 Figure 8: Change in Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric Between JMLP & MLP 
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Figure 9: Change in Anti-Elite, Anti-Pluralist, Appeals to People, Exclusionary, Overt Xenophobia, 
General Economy, & Right-Wing Populist Economic Rhetoric Between JMLP & MLP  
 
 
 
Figure 10: Comparison of the Percentage of Anti-Elite, Anti-Pluralist, Appeals to People, 
Exclusionary, Overt Xenophobia, General Economy, & Right-Wing Populist Economic Rhetoric in 
JMLP & MLP Campaign Speeches  
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Hypothesis 1 expects that the use of populist rhetoric of JMLP compared to MLP 
has experienced either a) no change or b) an increase.  In combining the results for both 
sets of campaign speeches for both JMLP and MLP and then comparing them, there was 
a 7.01% increase in the use of anti-elite references by MLP.  For anti-pluralist references, 
there was a 0.81% no change in the use of between JMLP and MLP.  In terms of the use 
of appeals to people, there was a 0.73% no change between JMLP and MLP.  Overall, 
with all categories combined, there was a 5.47% increase in the use of populist rhetoric 
by MLP.  
Hypothesis 2 expects that the use of xenophobic rhetoric of JMLP compared to 
MLP has experienced either a) no change or b) a decrease.   In combining the results for 
both sets of campaign speeches for both JMLP and MLP and then comparing them, there 
was 4.73% decrease in the use of exclusionary references by MLP.  For overt 
xenophobia, there was 3.79% increase by MLP.  Overall, with both categories combined, 
there was 0.95% no change between JMLP and MLP.  
Hypothesis 3 expects that the use of economic rhetoric of JMLP compared to 
MLP has experienced either a) no change or b) an increase.  In combining the results for 
both sets of campaign speeches for both JMLP and MLP and then comparing them, for 
references to the general economy there was 3.47% decrease by MLP.  For references to 
right-wing populist economics, there was a 1.03% decrease by MLP.  Overall, with both 
categories combined, there was a 4.49% decrease in the use of economic rhetoric by 
MLP.  Table 2 – Hypotheses Test represents a summary of my findings.  
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Table 2 – Hypotheses Test 
Hypothesis 1 
Populist Rhetoric 
Hypothesis 2 
Xenophobic Rhetoric 
Hypothesis 3 
Economic Rhetoric 
5.47% Increase 0.95% No Change 4.29% Decrease 
 
Using an increase or decrease of 5% as a notable shift, my findings show that for 
hypotheses 2 and 3 there was no significant change between JMLP and MLP.  For 
hypothesis 1, the results were over 5% by .47%. This is unexpected.  First, for Hypothesis 
1, from my review of the literature, I anticipated there would be a visible increase in 
overall populist rhetoric between JMLP and MLP.  However, the results show the 
increase was relatively small in populist rhetoric.  Between the different categories found 
under populist rhetoric, the initial increase in anti-elite rhetoric found in MLP’s 2011-
2012 campaign speeches corresponds to scholarly observations.  However, the MLP’s 
use of anti-pluralist sentiments and use of appeals to the people remains even to JMLP.  
The finding of a subsequent decline in populist rhetoric by MLP in her 2016-2017 
campaign speeches can be accounted for in that no other scholar had included her most 
recent rhetoric in their research. 
Second, for Hypothesis 2, again from my review of the literature, I expected there 
to be a decrease in xenophobic rhetoric between JMLP and MLP.  Instead, there was a 
decrease in the use of exclusionary populism by MLP, but an increase in overt 
xenophobia.  In order to account for this finding, I combined the results from the anti-
pluralist category under populist rhetoric with the results from both the exclusionary 
populist and overt xenophobia categories, since both are a subset of anti-pluralism.  From 
this comparison, there was a 1.76% decrease by MLP.   
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Lastly, for economic rhetoric, based on the literature I expected to see an increase 
between JMLP and MLP.  However, there was a decrease in the use of economic 
references.  For MLP’s 2011-2012 campaign speeches, this can likely be explained by 
her anti-elite criticism, specifically of economic elite, overtaking her discussion of 
economics.  Consequently, she hits two birds with one stone by referencing economic 
topics with a populist overtone.  This lends to the perception of an increase in economic 
rhetoric while actually increasing her populist rhetoric.  Then, in MLP’s 2016-2017 
campaign speeches, she replaces her anti-elite rhetoric with increased overt xenophobia. 
In sum, the data suggests that while there may have appeared to be an increase in 
populist rhetoric under MLP’s first campaign, her subsequent campaign shows that this is 
not a significant trend.  Indeed, my results illustrate how there is only a marginal .47% 
increase in the percentage of populist rhetoric between JMLP and MLP.  
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DISCUSSION 
In my review of scholarly claims concerning the Front National’s shift towards 
populist rhetoric, I outlined three different camps.  The first is the semantic camp which 
argues that there has been no foundational change to MLP’s rhetoric as compared to 
JMLP’s, merely updating to the context of the time.  The second is the dédiabolisation 
camp which argues that MLP has made a concentrated effort to decrease controversial 
ideas promoted by JMLP and increase discussion of more mainstream issues.  The third 
is the bandwagon camp which claims that MLP has joined the populist rhetoric 
movement trend. 
Due to there being only a relatively small increase in the use of populist rhetoric 
between JMLP and MLP, I believe my results are most in line with the semantic 
camp.  In particular, the systematic analysis conducted by Alduy and Wahnich (2015) 
which concluded that MLP has updated the Front National’s style of presentation and has 
altered aspects of its vocabulary.  Indeed, I argue that the perception of an increase in 
populist and economic rhetoric under MLP seems to do more with appearance than 
quantitative fact.  This speaks to the idea that while there is a populist rhetoric movement 
occurring, it is the increased saliency of populist rhetoric which makes it appear that 
MLP has increased in populist rhetoric.  This corresponds with Mayer’s (2015) and 
Mondon’s (2014) findings which state that the FN’s move towards populism began under 
JMLP and that MLP has merely continued to capitalize on the current populist 
trend.  Mondon (2014) in particular asserts that it was Nicolas Sarkozy’s cooptation of 
Front National stances which have allowed for the party’s message under MLP to appear 
more mainstream.  While the details of the rise of the association between the Front 
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National and populism is beyond the scope of this paper, a future analysis that takes into 
account rhetoric from other French political party leaders could shed light on this.   
A notable exception to my argument is the spike in anti-elite rhetoric used by 
MLP in her 2011-2012 campaign speeches and the increase in exclusionary rhetoric used 
in her 2016-2017 campaign speeches.  These changes could be accounted for first by the 
idea that a change in leadership will result in some rhetorical differences.  Moreover, 
these spikes could correspond with the MLP’s rhetorical responsiveness to exogenous 
factors – such as the refugee wave sweeping across Europe and an increase in 
fundamentalist Islamic terrorist attacks in France – which happen to fall in line with those 
categories during those time periods.  While an examination of contextual factors is 
beyond the scope of this paper, future research on the relation between current events and 
the rhetoric used by MLP would prove insightful.  Indeed, an overall expansion of my 
research to include MLP’s speeches between both her two campaigns would give 
structure to the shift from the increase in anti-elite rhetoric to the increase in exclusionary 
rhetoric. 
As for dédiabolisation - or dedemonization - of FN rhetoric, my n-gram and 
qualitative results show that this comes from a decrease in the use of certain words/ideas 
- like anti-Americanism and the death penalty - by MLP.  However, concepts that are no 
longer popular have been replaced with popular ones, like fear of Islamism and mass 
immigration.  This falls in line with the argument made by Gundogar (2013) who holds 
that the FN has made a concentrated effort to normalize its rhetoric.  However, the 
rhetoric of JMLP goes back much further than the two sets of campaign speeches I 
analyzed.  Consequently, an expanded timeframe on the rhetoric of JMLP might show 
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that there has indeed been a more drastic decrease in controversial language and overt 
xenophobia.  Alternatively, my results may speak to William’s (2011) argument that, 
since MLP has not been president of the Front National as long as JMLP was and has 
been careful with her message, she has not made mistakes like he did to tarnish the 
party’s image and label it as xenophobic and racist.   
With respects to economic rhetoric, of the scholars that mention a change between 
JMLP and MLP (see Alduy & Wahnich 2015; Bastow 2018; Goodliffe 2016; Gundogar 
2013; Mayer 2013; Williams 2011), they all argue there has been an increase under 
MLP.   However, my results show there has been an overall decrease.  The main possible 
reason for this difference of observation is that there was a spike in economic rhetoric by 
MLP in her 2011-2012 campaign speeches.  This corresponds with permeation across 
Europe of the 2008 economic recession.  This is the point to which most scholars base 
their observations on.  Indeed, the most comprehensive by Alduy & Wahnich (2015) only 
went to the end of that campaign.  In her 2016-2017 campaign speeches, though, MLP 
maintains an even discussion of the general economy, but replaces her criticism of 
economic elite – which comprised much of her economic rhetoric previously –, with an 
increased overt xenophobic message.  
As for the National Front’s increasing electoral success under MLP, my results 
suggest this is not due to an increase in populist rhetoric.  Rather, the party’s appeal to 
voters may have more to due with cooptation of traditionally far-right issues by 
mainstream French political parties50, pertinent contextual factors which either align with 
the Front National’s message or which the FN molds their message around, and the 
                                                 
50 During the 2017 French presidential elections, Alduy (2017) measured and compared the most frequently 
used words among the top candidates, including MLP.   
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saliency of these issues among voters.  Overall, further analysis would be needed to 
measure the impact of each of these possibilities on why the French people vote for the 
FN.  In particular, an analysis of the role that media has played in the presentation of 
MLP, the party, and a possible connection with populism could further elucidate why 
assertions about a populist rhetorical shift have been hypothesized. 
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CONCLUSION 
Scholars of the Front National have postulated several arguments as to whether 
and when the party’s rhetoric moved towards populism.  Some claimed that the shift 
began under JMLP; others assert that the cooptation of FN issues by Nicolas Sarkozy 
launched its rhetoric into the mainstream; others argue that rising party leaders like MLP 
spearheaded the transition; lastly, some counter that the Front National’s rhetoric has not 
shifted towards populism.   
The quantitative analysis of my thesis gives concrete numbers to this 
debate.  Namely that there has been a relatively small increase in the populist rhetoric 
used between JMLP and MLP.  However, at a time when the saliency of populism 
increased, the FN experienced a leadership change.  This provided the party the 
opportunity to change its image in many respects as well as update the context of key 
issues. 
While my findings provide insight as to whether a populist rhetorical shift is 
actually occurring within the Front National, they contain several limitations.  First, the 
creation of my dictionary was limited to a select sample size.  In order to refine my 
results, I would need to increase the sample size used to create my dictionary.  This 
would allow me to list out more possible n-grams.  Moreover, my categorization of the n-
grams under certain rhetorical categories was based on a limited literature review.  
Further study of the literature on populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric would 
enable me to narrow what falls under each category.  In particular, I would be able to 
better distinguish between anti-pluralist and exclusionary rhetoric as well as anti-elite and 
right-wing populist economic rhetoric.    
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Nevertheless, the results of my findings should not be discounted.  Of particular 
note is my addition of MLP’s 2016-2017 campaign speeches.  No other scholar had 
included her most recent rhetoric in their analyses.  Moreover, no other scholar had 
specifically sought to measure the populist rhetoric between JMLP and MLP.  As a result, 
my findings provide unique insight into the debate as to whether the FN is actually 
increasing in populist rhetoric.   
In relation to the definition of populism, my findings lend insight into the broader 
discussion as to whether populism is an ideology, a strategy, or a discursive style.  In 
particular, the results that MLP initially increased the Front National’s anti-elite rhetoric 
in her 2011-2012 campaign, but then shifted her emphasis toward anti-pluralist 
exclusionary sentiments in her 2016-2017 campaign.  This possibly represents a strategic 
shift in message to reflect the current issues of the time, rather than representing a 
foundational change in ideology.  While my research did not delineate out the verbal 
structures of JMLP’s and MLP’s speeches and my sample size was limited to two 
speakers, the two did share common discursive styles – namely, the criticism of enemies, 
the use of black and white options, and emotional appeals.  While the exact enemies, 
options, and appeals varied between them, the overall message did not seem to change.  
Consequently, it could be argued that the core ideology of the Front National is populist 
in nature. 
In terms of xenophobic rhetoric, my analysis results create further questions 
regarding the line between anti-pluralism, exclusionary populism, and xenophobia.  In 
particular, whereas the Front National was once seen as a xenophobic party, under 
MLP’s leadership this view has been somewhat mitigated.  However, MLP actually 
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increased the party’s exclusionary rhetoric in her most recent campaign.  As a result, the 
perception of certain rhetoric as xenophobic or not may have more to do with current 
contextual factors and political correctness than a well-refined definition.  For the FN in 
particular this implies that its dédiabolisation efforts symbolized a shift towards 
addressing contemporary issues with more appealing rhetoric.    
As for the Front National, overall, my thesis suggests that the party’s current 
image and message under MLP plays to exogenous factors and the fears of voters.  
Indeed, the recent electoral success of FN candidates is linked to the saliency of pertinent 
issues and the party’s rhetorical adjustment to correspond with them.  Overall, the party 
continues to strive to shed its past image under JMLP.  Indeed, after reiteration of 
controversial statements, MLP had JMLP expelled from the party.51 Following the 
MLP’s unsuccessful presidential bid in the 2017 election, the FN renamed itself to the 
Rassemblement National.  Meanwhile, another key leader from the party – Florian 
Philipot – broke away to create a more conservative party, Les Patriotes.  In the end, it 
remains to be seen as to whether these changes will signal further acceptance of the party 
by mainstream politics and continued electoral success.   
In conclusion, my research contributes to the ongoing dialogue surrounding the 
rise of populist rhetoric and, in particular, its use with the Front National of 
France.  While my findings contribute to the groundwork of establishing a dictionary for 
populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric, my results are limited to the FN.  However, 
my methods can serve as a model for further analysis of the National Front as well as 
other parties considered to use populist rhetoric.  Indeed, my research raises several 
                                                 
51 “French National Front expels founder Jean-Marie Le Pen”. BBC News. 20 August 2015. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34009901  
63 
 
questions worth examining.  Of note: 1) the connection between the perceived used of 
populist rhetoric and labeling a party as populist; 2) the foundational categorization of 
populism as an ideology, strategy, or discursive style; 3) the use of populist rhetoric by a 
political party and its perceived mainstreaming; 4) the role of the media in the saliency of 
populism and populist parties; and 5) the use of populist rhetoric by a political party 
contributing to voter appeal and electoral success.  
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Table 3: Comparison of Rhetoric Used by JMLP, by MLP, and by JMLP and MLP 
 
JMLP BOTH JMLP & MLP MLP 
• Xenophobia 
• Anti-Semitism 
• Traditionalism  
• Naturalism – need for 
space, humans to 
follow the laws of 
nature  
• Appeal to Christian 
morality 
• Anti-homosexuality 
• Abrogation of civil 
unions 
• Anti-communism  
• Law & order 
a) Return of the 
     death penalty 
• Reference to WWII 
and French colonial 
wars 
• Reference to 
fatherland 
• Capitalize on crises 
• Renounce ideology - 
claim to be neither right 
nor left.   
• List of enemies 
• Nationalism 
• Anti-immigration  
• Focus on insecurity 
• Decry decline in French 
nationality/identity  
• Push for national 
preference.  
• Merit-based 
naturalization  
• Offering of black and 
white choices  
• Frequent scapegoating 
• Reference to personal 
life  
• Use of vulgarity and 
opposition language.  
• Clear, short, and simple 
messages 
• Call for direct 
democracy via 
referendum  
• Appeal to common sense 
of electorate 
• Appeal to sense of 
exploitation by the 
establishment   
• Toning down of 
controversial statements, 
namely with: 
a) Racial mixing 
b) Anti-communism 
c) Anti-Americanism 
d) Christian morality  
e) Anti-Semitism 
f) Anti-immigrant  
g) Exclusionism  
h) Death penalty  
• Increased reference to 
laïcité - or secularism  
• Increased reference to 
democracy  
• Claim to be the defender 
of the traditional values 
of the French Republic 
• Call to restore national 
sovereignty  
• Attacks on 
multiculturalism and 
Islam with the argument 
that they are 
incompatible with 
Republican values 
• Call for controlled 
immigration 
• Acceptance of abortion, 
homosexuality, and civil 
unions  
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• Increased economic 
discourse:  
a) Economy service 
for the people  
b) Opposition to EU, 
European Central 
Bank, and euro  
c) Attack capitalism 
without frontiers 
d) Anti-globalization  
e) Call for financial 
regulation 
f) Pro small business 
 
Table 4: List of Programmes Présidentiels 
Candidate Year Month Platform Name Transcription/Video Source 
JMLP 2002 
 
April Programme de M. Jean-
Marie Le Pen 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/023001406.html  
JMLP 2007 March Programme électoral de 
Jean-Marie Le Pen 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073001250.html 
MLP 2012 January Programme de Mme Marine 
Le Pen 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/123000632.html 
MLP 2017 April 144 Engagements 
Présidentiels 
https://rassemblementnational.fr/pdf/144-
engagements.pdf. 
 
 
Table 5: List of JMLP Campaign Speeches 2001-2002 
Number Year Day Location Speech Name Transcription/Video Source 
1 2001 1 May  Paris La Bataille de 
France 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/013002510.html  
2 2001 18 August La Trinité-
sur-mer 
Discours de La 
Trinité sur mer 
meeting  
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/013003201.html 
  
3 2001 23 
September 
Paris Discours de Paris 
BBR, Une minute 
de silence 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/013003201.html  
4 2001 1 
December 
Paris Discours de Paris 
colloque 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/023000368.html  
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5 2002 19 
January 
Brest Discours de Brest 
Meeting 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/023000868.html  
6 2002 20 
January 
Nantes Discours de Nantes 
Meeting 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/023000881.html  
7 2002 26 
January 
Tours Discours de Tours http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/023000909.html  
8 2002 27 
January 
Paris Discours de Paris 
colloque 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/023000912.html  
N/A 2002 12 
February 
Bordeaux Discours de 
Bordeaux Meeting 
Unable to find video or transcript. 
9 2002 17 
February 
Lyon Discours de Lyon 
convention Le Pen 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/023001278.html  
10 2002 21 
February 
Paris Discours de Paris 
colloque 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/023001283.html  
11 2002 3 March Lille Discours de Lille 
meeting 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/023001291.html  
12 2002 1 May Paris Discours de Paris http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/023001628.html  
13  2002 2 May Marseille Discours de 
Marseille Meeting 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/023001684.html  
 
Table 6: List of JMLP Campaign Speeches 2006-2007 
Number Year Day Location Speech Name Transcription/Video Source 
1 2006 1 May Paris Discours du 1er 
Mai  
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/063001580.html  
2 2006 20 May Paris Discours de Paris 
An 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/063001831.html  
3 2006 17 June Paris Discours de Paris  http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/063002330.html  
4 2006 20 
September 
Valmy Discours de Valmy  http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/063003354.html  
5 2006 8 October Palavas-
les-Flots 
Discours de 
Palavas-les-Flots 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/063003622.html  
6 2006 22 
October 
Vendée Discours aux 
Herbiers 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/063003740.html  
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7 2006 29 
October 
Parcay-
Meslay 
Discours de 
Parcay-Meslay 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/063003859.html  
8 2006 5 
November 
Bordeaux Discours de 
Bordeaux 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/063003929.html  
9 2006 12 
November 
Le 
Bourget 
Discours du 
Bourget 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/063004015.html  
10 2006 19 
November 
Metz Discours de Metz http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/063004114.html  
11 2006 26 
November 
Dijon Discours de Dijon http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/063004223.html  
N/A 2007 4 January N/A Voeux (Greetings) Unable to find video or transcript. 
12 2007 21 
January 
Paris Discours de la 
Plaine-Saint-Denis, 
Meeting à Paris  
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073000254.html  
13 2007 27 
January 
Yvetot Discours de Yvetot http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073000352.html  
14 2007 11 
February 
Nantes Discours de Nantes http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073000566.html  
15 2007 20 
February 
Paris Discours au forum 
Chasse et Ruralité 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073000679.html  
16 2007 25 
February 
Lille Convention 
présidentielle de 
Lille 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073000758.html  
17 2007 3 March Marseille Discours de 
Marseille 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073001305.html  
18 2007 6 March Paris Discours au Salon 
de l’agriculture 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073001306.html  
19 2007 11 March Lyon Discours de Lyon http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073000944.html  
20 2007 21 March Paris Allocution devant 
la CGPME 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073001150.html  
21 2007 23 March Paris Discours de Paris http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073001151.html  
22 2007 24 March Nimes Discours devant 
l’USDIFRA de 
Nimes 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073001181.html  
23 2007 25 March Toulouse Discours de 
Toulouse 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073001152.html  
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24 2007 31 March Paris Discours de Paris http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073001280.html  
25 2007 6 April Argenteuil Discours de 
Argenteuil  
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073001384.html  
26 2007 15 April Paris Discours de Paris http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073001490.html  
27 2007 19 April Nice Discours de Nice http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/073001547.html  
N/A 2007 22 April  N/A Discours au soir du 
premier tour 
Unable to find video or transcript. 
 
Table 7: List of MLP Campaign Speeches 2011-2012 
Number Year Day Location Speech Name Transcription/Video Source 
1 2011 1 May Paris Discours du 1er mai https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Cu9MmDyEWiY  
2 2011 11 
September 
Nice Discours de Nice https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=30QXFayYaKk  
3 2011 19 
November 
Paris Présentation du 
Projet 
Présidentiel/Progra
mme présidentiel 
https://www.dailymotion.com/vid
eo/xmfz5u  
4 2011 30 
November 
Pontoise Discours auprès des 
forains 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=8ApMG8iYWQY  
N/A 2011 8 
December 
Paris Discours devant le 
Sénat contre le droit 
de vote des 
étrangers 
Unable to find video or transcript. 
5 2011 11 
December 
Metz Discours de clôture https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=EmqN5LMUCXE  
6 2012 6 January Saint-
Denis 
Galette des rois https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VNu1GKbF6DU  
7 2012 15 January  Rouen Discours de Rouen https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=6UhrNEjWMb4  
8 2012 22 January Bordeaux Discours de Palais 
des congrès de 
Bordeaux 
http://www.frontnational.com/vid
eos/grand-meeting-de-marine-le-
pen-a-bordeaux-le-22-janvier/  
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9 2012 30 January Perpignan Grand Meeting 
Présidentiel à 
Perpignan 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=O1Dwe-pCXxs  
10 2012 5 February Toulouse Meeting à Toulouse https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Co2wg9PgWtU  
N/A 2012 12 
February 
Paris Discours de Paris Unable to find video or transcript. 
11 2012 12 
February 
Strasbourg Grand meeting de 
Marine Le Pen à 
Strasbourg 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=FaJmzq_OA5g  
12 2012 19 
February 
Lille Meeting de Marine 
Le Pen à Lille 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=uZLJDNXh1sg  
13 2012 26 
February 
Val-de-
Loire 
Discours de 
Châteauroux 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=s2tFg-I3r9M  
14 2012 4 March Marseille Meeting de Marine 
Le Pen à Marseille 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=4PqW4ykP2Bk  
15 2012 13 March Henin-
Beaumont 
Déclaration de 
candidature 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=0TGA6cyx-dY  
16 2012 16 March Palavas-
Les-Flots 
Discours de Marine 
Le Pen à Palavas-
Les-Flots 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=1hxkZ86NgL0  
17 2012 17 March Ajaccio Discours de Marine 
Le Pen en Corse à 
Ajaccio 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=HwjsJSO2UyY  
18 2012 25 March Nantes Déplacement à 
Nantes 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/123000721.ht
ml  
19 2012 29 March Montpellier Congrès de la 
FNSEA à 
Montpellier 
http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/123000722.ht
ml  
20 2012 20 March Nice Meeting de Marine 
Le Pen à Nice 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=loatjnSZtCk  
21 2012 7 April Lyon Meeting de Marine 
Le Pen à Lyon 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=wyHKdGjq8YE  
N/A 2012 11 April Brachay Discours de Marine 
Le Pen à Brachay : 
Unable to find video or transcript. 
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« Les campagnes 
d’abord ! » 
22 2012 17 April Paris Meeting de Marine 
Le Pen au Zénith 
Paris 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=LPjB4vcsq3Y  
23 2012 20 April Merdrignac Discours de 
Merdrignac 
(Bretagne) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Q7zNPC9K3VM  
 
Table 8: List of MLP Campaign Speeches 2016-2017 
Number Year Day Location Speech Name Transcription/Video Source 
1 2016 2 May Paris Discours de Marine 
Le Pen 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=O617QgkAVi4   
2 2016 21 June Vienne Printemps 
patriotique à 
Vienne: discours de 
Marine Le Pen 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=tuxZpPwpc3Q  
N/A 2016 10 
September 
Reims Discours de Marine 
Le Pen aux Assises 
du Produire en 
France 
Unable to find video or transcript. 
Coding 
Scheme 
2016 18 
September 
Fréjus Discours de Marine 
Le Pen aux Estivales 
de Fréjus 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=WgAng1wIBtU  
5 2016 23 
September 
Paris Discours de Marine 
Le Pen à la 
convention 
présidentielle sur 
l'Ecole 
http://www.voxfnredekker.com/ar
chives/2016/09/22/34354981.html  
6 2016 11 
October 
Cournon-
d’Auvergne 
Convention sur la 
protection animale : 
discours de Marine 
Pen 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t
ime_continue=843&v=_Y3ctmSd
Wwk  
Video 
Message - 
Excluded 
2016 20 
October 
N/A Je soutiens la 
police!  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=J0Pj1nYpaE0    
7 2016 21 
October 
Paris Lancement du 
Collectif Seniors : 
discours de Marine 
Le Pen  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=XS2sWEhNdrE    
  
8 2016 9 
November 
Paris Discours de Marine 
Le Pen : « La 
http://www.frontnational.com/vid
eos/discours-de-marine-le-pen-la-
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France, Civilisation 
mondiale au XXIème 
siècle »  
france-civilisation-mondiale-au-
xxieme-siecle/    
Press 
Conference 
- Excluded 
2016 9 
November 
N/A Réaction de Marine 
Le Pen aux résultats 
des élections 
américaines 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VdhZ4TmV5Pc  
10 2016 5 
December 
Paris Écologie et énergie 
de demain : discours 
de Marine Le Pen 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=enMJbVPmK-A    
11 2016 9 
December 
Paris « Santé : protégeons 
les Français ! » : 
discours de Marine 
Le Pen 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=BkGJJJq2pis   
Press 
Conference 
- Excluded 
2017 4 January N/A Marine Le Pen 
présente ses voeux à 
la presse  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=vHebt7wb5u4   
12 2017 6 January Paris « France, pays 
d'entrepreneurs, 
pays d'innovation » : 
discours de Marine 
Le Pen 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Ry9ao3wAbMI  
European 
Parliament 
- Excluded 
2017 23 January Coblence Discours de Marine 
Le Pen au Congrès 
ENL de Coblence 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VUpx0MtHYT4   
14 2017 5 February Lyon Assises 
présidentielles de 
Lyon : Discours de 
Marine Le Pen 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=ZHPOW91K-fM  
15 2017 20 
February 
Clairvaux-
les-lacs 
Réunion publique de 
Marine Le Pen à 
Clairvaux-les-Lacs  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t
ime_continue=2439&v=U5eDMK
rUWT8  
16 2017 24 
February 
Paris  Conférence 
présidentielle n°2 : « 
La politique 
internationale de la 
France » 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=p2qm0nybjIY  
17 2017 25 
February 
Pierrelatte Réunion publique de 
Marine Le Pen à 
Pierrelatte 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t
ime_continue=2742&v=sfnFMbw
bGeE  
18 2017 27 
February 
Nantes Discours de Marine 
Le Pen à Nantes 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=CdtFEu5NB6U  
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19 2017 3 March Paris Conférence 
présidentielle : « Le 
rôle de l'Etat dans 
l'économie » 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=BoFYTCQz214  
20 2017 11 March Châteauroux Discours de Marine 
Le Pen à 
Châteauroux 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=TXIM5njpOSs  
21 2017 11 March  Mirande Réunion publique de 
Marine Le Pen à 
Mirande  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t
ime_continue=2389&v=CQi8Vw
wXQ0w  
22 2017 16 March Saint-
Raphael 
Réunion publique de 
Marine Le Pen à 
Saint-Raphaël 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=046tWgJBZGc  
Outside 
France - 
Excluded 
2017 23 March N’Djamena 
(Chad) 
Discours de Marine 
Le Pen à N'Djaména  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=NVCWFA92OwE  
23 2017 27 March Lille Meeting de Marine 
Le Pen à Lille 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Ffg7--qnEyE  
24 2017 27 March Sables 
d’Olonne 
Discours de Marine 
Le Pen aux Sables 
d'Olonne 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=wV65ZP66gbE  
Q & A 
Panel - 
Excluded 
2017 28 March  N/A Marine Le Pen 
invitée de la 
matinale « 
Présidentielle 2017 
» organisée par le 
MEDEF 
http://www.frontnational.com/vid
eos/marine-le-pen-invitee-de-la-
matinale-presidentielle-2017-
organisee-par-le-medef/  
25 2017 31 March Trinite-
Porhoet 
Réunion publique de 
Marine Le Pen à La 
Trinité-Porhoët 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=yclqBOG_u2A  
26 2017 2 April Bordeaux   Discours de Marine 
Le Pen au meeting à 
Bordeaux 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=LFsPBrprB1E  
27 2017 4 April Bazoche-
Gouet 
Réunion publique de 
Marine Le Pen à La 
Bazoche-Gouet 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=LOARVmbZhuw  
28 2017 6 April Monswiller Réunion publique de 
Marine Le Pen à 
Monswiller en 
Alsace 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t
ime_continue=3313&v=nEFh_tM
58YA  
29 2017 9 April Ajaccio Meeting de Marine 
Le Pen à Ajaccio 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=4Vv1_Kth9-s  
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30 2017 11 April Paris Conférence 
présidentielle n°5 : « 
La France face au 
défi terroriste » 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=uoFfFCsZ4WE  
31 2017 11 April  Arcis-sur-
Aube 
Réunion publique de 
Marine Le Pen à 
Arcis-sur-Aube 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=kCUU_E4vk6I  
32 2017 15 April Perpignan Meeting de Marine 
Le Pen à Perpignan 
  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t
ime_continue=4674&v=kJLo8-
zGMIk  
33 2017 17 April Paris Grand meeting de 
Marine Le Pen au 
Zénith de Paris  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=6cwimaYTt68  
34 2017 19 April Marseille Discours de Marine 
Le Pen à Marseille 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=rcWk4S-82rI  
35 2017 23 April  Henin-
Beaumont 
Allocution de 
Marine Le Pen au 
soir du premier tour 
de l'élection 
présidentielle 
http://www.frontnational.com/vid
eos/allocution-de-marine-le-pen-
au-soir-du-premier-tour-de-
lelection-presidentielle/  
36 2017 28 April Nice Meeting de Marine 
Le Pen à Nice 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=MA6V2_t6wbY  
37 2017 1 May Villepinte Grande réunion 
publique de Marine 
Le Pen à Villepinte 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=jHlrg4sX0xo   
 
Table 9: Populist Rhetoric Dictionary  
Anti-elite 
Disdain for the power held by the 
political class and administrative 
bureaucracy. 
Anti-pluralist 
Belief that “the people” are  
homogeneous and that their 
culture needs to be protected. 
Appeal to people 
Idea that ordinary citizens house 
inherent “common sense” which 
lends them authority.  
1) Administrat* 
• Administation 
2) Adversaire politique  
• Political adversary 
3) Américain 
• American 
4) Argent privé 
• Private money 
5) Autorités 
supranationales  
• Supranational 
authorities 
1) Assimil* 
• Assimilation  
2) Citoyenneté française 
• French citizenship 
3) Civilisation française  
• French civilization 
4) Cohésion sociale 
• Social cohesion 
5) Collectivité 
• Collectivity  
6) Communauté nationale 
• National community 
1) Âme des peuples 
• Soul of the people 
2) Colère du peuple 
• Anger of the people 
3) Le peuple français 
• The French people 
4) Légitime colère 
• Justified anger 
5) Peuple de France 
• People of France 
6) Populis* 
• Populism 
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6) Banq-; banc- 
• Bank 
7) Banque Centrale 
Européenne 
• Central European Bank 
8) Banque Mondiale 
• World Bank  
9) Banques d’affaires 
• Business banks 
10) Baron 
• Baron 
11) Bobo  
• Upper middle class 
12) Bourgeois 
• Upper middle class 
13) Bruxelles 
• Brussels 
14) Bureaucra* 
• Bureaucrat 
15) Centralise* 
• To centralize 
16) Classe politique 
• Political class 
17) Classe populaire 
• The underclass 
18) Clientélisme 
• Cronyism  
19) Commission européenne 
• European Commission 
20) Conseil européen 
• European Council 
21) Convention européenne 
• European Convention 
22) Corruption 
• Corruption 
23) Décentralis* 
• To decentralize 
24) Détrui* 
• To destroy 
25) Élites 
• Elite 
26) Ennemi 
• Ennemy 
27) Étatisme 
• Statism  
28) Euro-atlantique  
• Euro-Atlantic 
29) Financ* 
• Finance 
30) FMI 
• International Monetary 
Fund 
31) Groupes de pressions 
7) Communautarisme 
• Communitarianism 
8) Cultur* 
• Culture 
9) Défend* 
• To defend 
10) Démocrat*  
• Democracy 
11) Désintégration sociale 
• Social disintegration 
12) Diversité 
• Diversity  
13) Double nationalité 
• Dual nationality 
14) Droit de la nationalité 
• Nationality law 
15) Égalité  
• Equality  
16) Équilibre 
démographique 
• Demographic balance 
17) État de droit 
• Rule of law; State of 
order 
18) Etre français 
• To be French  
19) Familles françaises 
• French families 
20) Femme* 
• Women 
21) Féodalités locales 
• Local feudalities 
22) Fracture sociale 
• Social fracture 
23) Française d’origine 
étrangère 
• French of foreign 
origin 
24) France rurale 
• Rural France 
25) Fraternité  
• Brotherhood 
26) Ghett* 
• Ghetto  
27) Heritage 
• Heritage 
28) Identité  
• Identity 
29) Individualisme 
• Individualism  
30) Injustice sociale  
• Social injustice 
31) Intégration  
7) Pouvoir aux citoyen 
• Power of the citizen 
8) Référend* 
• Referendum 
9) Responsabilité 
• Responsibility 
10) Sens moral 
• Moral sense 
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• Pressure groups 
32) Hollande (François)  
33) Libéral-social 
• Liberal-social  
34) Libero-gaulliste 
• Liberal-Gaullist 
35) Lobbies 
• Lobbyists  
36) Média 
• Media  
37) Multination* 
• Multination 
38) Monopol* 
• Monopoloy 
39) Oligarchie politico-
économique 
• Political-economic 
oligarchy 
40) OMC  
• World Trade 
Organization 
41) ONU  
• United Nations 
42) OTAN  
• North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization 
43) PAC  
• Civil solidarity pact 
44) Parlement européen 
• European Parliament 
45) Propagande  
• Propaganda 
46) PS  
• Socialist Party 
47) Puissances d’argent 
• Money powers 
48) Renégoci* 
• To renegotiate 
49) RGPP  
• French General Review 
of Public Policies  
50) Royaume-Uni 
• United Kingdom 
51) Sarkozy (Nicolas) 
52) Schengen  
• Schengen Treaty 
53) Socialis* 
• Socialist 
54) Syndica* 
• Union 
55) Technocrat* 
• Technocrat 
56) Théoriciens 
• Integration 
32) Jeanne d’Arc 
• Joan of Arc 
33) Justice 
• Justice 
34) Laïcité 
• Secularism 
35) La Nation 
• The Nation  
36) Langue française  
• French language 
37) Loi française  
• French law 
38) Multicult* 
• Multicultural 
39) Natalité française 
• French birthrate 
40) National* 
• National 
41) Nationalité 
• Nationality  
42) Naturalis* 
• To naturalize  
43) Née 
• Born 
44) Nos campagnes 
• Our land 
45) Normes  
• Norms 
46) Notre langue  
• Our language 
47) Pacte Républicain 
• Republican Pact 
48) Patriot* 
• Patriot 
49) Patrimoine naturel 
• Natural heritage 
50) Perte  
• Loss  
51) Pléthor* 
• Plethoric  
52) Propre pays 
• Our country 
53) Protection social 
• Social protection 
54) Proteg* 
• To protect 
55) Républicaine* 
• Republican 
56) République française  
• French Republic 
57) Séparation des églises 
et de l’État  
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• Theorists 
57) Théorie du complot 
• Conspiracy theory 
58) Traités européens 
• European treaties 
59) Ultra-libér* 
• Ultra-liberal 
60) UE/Unions Européens 
• European Union 
61) UMP  
• Union for a Popular 
Movement 
• Separation of Church 
and State 
58) Société française 
• French society 
59) Solidarité nationale 
• National solidarity 
60) Souverain* 
• Sovereign 
61) Structures morales 
• Moral structures 
62) Terre de France 
• Land of France 
63) Territoire  
• Territory 
64) Valeurs  
• Values 
65) Zones de non-droit 
• Areas of lawlessness 
 
 
Table 10: Xenophobic Rhetoric Dictionary  
Note: All exclusionary populist rhetoric is a sub-category of anti-pluralist rhetoric.  All xenophobic 
rhetoric is a sub-category of exclusionary populist rhetoric.  
Exclusionary Populism 
Aims to restrict certain groups from 1) receiving state 
benefits, 2) engaging in the democratic process, and 
3) being considered part of “the people”.  
Overt Xenophobia 
Negative reference to other ethnic identities, at 
times inciting fear, hatred, and hostility, with a 
belief that people have an inherent right to live 
separately from these other ethnicities. 
1) Apaisé 
• Appeased 
2) Barrière 
• Barrier  
3) Carte de séjour 
• Residence card 
4) Clandestin 
• Clandestin 
5) Combatt* 
• To fight 
6) Contrôl* 
• To control  
7) Criminel 
• Criminal 
8) Délinquant 
• Offender 
9) Discrimination positive 
• Affirmative action  
10) Étrang* 
• Foreign  
11) Explus* 
• To expel 
1) Africain* 
• African 
2) Agression 
• Aggression  
3) Antillais 
• Person from the West Indies 
4) Arabe* 
• Arab 
5) Asiatique 
• Asian 
6) Attentat* 
• Bombing 
7) Attaques organisées 
• Organized attacks 
8) Barbar* 
• Barbarian 
9) Beur* 
• Child of a North African immigrant 
10) Danger 
• Danger 
11) Differentialisme 
• Differentialism 
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12) Flots d’immigrant 
• Immigrant waves 
13) Flux migratoires 
• Migratory wave 
14) Frontière 
• Border 
15) Illégal 
• Illegal 
16) Immigré* 
• Immigrant 
17) Immigration  
• Immigration 
18) Incontrôlé 
• Uncontrolled  
19) Indignité  
• Indignity 
20) Interdi* 
• To prohibit 
21) Lutt* 
• To Fight  
22) Massive 
• Mssive 
23) Migrant* 
• Migrant 
24) Multi recidivist* 
• Multi-recividist 
25) Pacifier 
• To pacify  
26) Population étrangère 
• Foreign Population  
27) Préférence  
• Preference 
28) Priorité  
• Priority 
29) Récidivist* 
• Recidivist 
30) Regroupement familial 
• Family reunification  
31) Ressortissants étrangers 
• Foreign nationals  
32) Sécurité  
• Security  
33) Séjour illégal 
• Illegal stay  
34) Séquestriations 
• Sequestration  
35) Tolérance zero 
• Zero tolerance 
 
12) Droit à la difference 
• Right to difference 
13) Extremist* 
• Extremist 
14) Fondamental* 
• Fundamentalist  
15) Gitan* 
• Gypsy 
16) Homosexuel* 
• Homosexual 
17) Indo-pakistanais* 
• Person from south Asia 
18) Insécurité 
• Insecurity 
19) Invasion 
• Invasion 
20) Islam* 
• Islam 
21) Juif* 
• Jew 
22) Maghreb 
• North Africa 
23) Mosqué* 
• Mosque 
24) Musulman* 
• Muslim 
25) Pied Noir* 
• Person of French origin born in 
Algeria 
26) Pillage 
• Looting 
27) Saccage 
• Pillage 
28) Salafist* 
• Salafist 
29) Soumission 
• Submission 
30) Terror* 
• Terror 
31) Violence 
• Violence 
32) Viols* 
• Rape 
33) Ultraviolent* 
• Ultraviolent 
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Table 11: Economic Rhetoric Dictionary  
General Economy 
Statements about the wealth and resources of a 
country, in particular production, consumption, and 
services. 
Right-wing Populist 
Advocates anti-globalization, protection of 
national businesses and native employment, and 
regulation of the elite. 
1. Agence de notation 
• Rating Agency 
2. Aide au logement 
• Housing assistance 
3. Aide sociale 
• Social assistance 
4. Argent public 
• Public money 
5. Assurance maladie 
• Health insurance  
6. Augmentation de salaire 
• Salary increase 
7. Austérité  
• Austerity  
8. Balance commerciale 
• Trade balance 
9. Budget  
• Budget 
10. CETA  
• Canada-European Union 
Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement 
11. Chiffr* 
• Numbers 
12. Chôm* 
• Unemployment 
13. CMU (couverture maladie universelle) 
• Universal health coverage 
14. Commerce 
• Trade 
15. Concurrence 
• Competition 
16. Consommation 
• Consumption 
17. Contribution sociale 
• Social contribution 
18. Cotisations 
• Contribution 
19. Coûts de gestion 
• Administrative costs 
20. Coût de logement 
• Housing costs 
21. Crise financière  
• Financial crisis  
22. Croissance 
1. Agric* 
• Agriculture 
2. AME (Aide médicale d'État) 
• State medical aid  
3. Artisans 
• Artisans 
4. Banq-; banc- 
• Bank 
5. Barrières douanières 
• Custom barriers  
6. CECA  
• European Coal and Steel 
Community 
7. Chômage de masse 
• Mass unemployment 
8. Contrat de stabilization 
• Stabilization contract 
9. Délocalisation 
• Relocation  
10. Dumping social 
• Social dumping  
11. Élite* 
• Elite 
12. Évasion fiscale  
• Fiscal evasion  
13. Financ*  
• Finance  
14. Global* 
• Global 
15. Grand* distribut* 
• Mass distribution  
16. Liberalis* 
• To liberalize  
17. Main d’oeuvre 
• Manual labor  
18. MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de 
France) 
• Movement of the Enterprises of 
France 
19. Métier manuel 
• Manual occupation  
20. Mondialisme 
• Globalism  
21. Mondiale sauvage 
• Uncontrolled globalism 
22. Mondialisation 
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• Growth 
23. CSG (contribution sociale généralisée) 
• General social contribution 
24. Dépenses 
• Expenses 
25. Dette 
• Debt 
26. Développ* 
• To develop 
27. Disparité 
• Disparity  
28. Droit de douane 
• Customs duty 
29. Économ* 
• Economy  
30. Emploi 
• Work 
31. Endettement 
• Debt 
32. Entrepr* 
• Business; entrepreneur 
33. Euro 
• Euro 
34. Export* 
• Export 
35. Fisc* 
• Fiscal 
36. Gaspill* 
• To waste 
37. Grande distribution 
38. Impôt 
• Tax 
39. Industrie 
• Industry 
40. Investissement 
• Investment 
41. Laboureur 
• Worker 
42. Marché  
• Market 
43. Modernis* 
• To modernize 
44. Monnaie 
• Currency 
45. Ouvrier 
• Worker 
46. Patronat 
• Employer 
47. Pauvreté 
• Poverty  
48. PIB  
• GDP 
49. Pouvoir d’achat 
• Globalization  
23. Moyennes entrepr* 
• Medium-sized business 
24. OMC (Organisation Mondiale du 
Commerce) 
• World Trade Organiation  
25. PAC (Politique Agricole Commune) 
• Common Agricultural Policy  
26. Patriotisme économique 
• Economic patriotism  
27. Petites entrepr* 
• Small business  
28. Plan de renflouement 
• Bailout plan  
29. PME (Petites et Moyennes Entreprises) 
• Small and Medium Businesses  
30. PMI  
• European Manufacturing 
Purchasing Managers Index 
31. Quota d’importation 
• Import quota 
32. Ravage  
• Ravage 
33. Reconqu* 
• To reclaim  
34. Réindustrialisation 
• Reindustrialization  
35. Rétabl* 
• To reestablish  
36. Souveraineté monétaire 
• Monetary sovereignty  
37. Libre-échange* 
• Free trade 
38. Travail manuel  
• Manual work  
39. Travail précaire 
• Precarious work  
40. Zone euro  
• Euro zone  
41. Zone rurale  
• Rural areas 
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• Purchasing power 
50. Privatis* 
• To privatize  
51. Prospérité 
• Prosperity  
52. Protection sociale 
• Social protection 
53. Réform* 
• To reform  
54. Règle 
• Rule 
55. Régulation 
• Regulation  
56. Retraite 
• Retirement 
57. RMI (revenu minimum d’insertion) 
• Social welfare income  
58. RSI (régime social des indépendants) 
• Self-employed social security  
59. Salaire 
• Salary 
60. Sécurité sociale 
• Security social  
61. Services publics 
• Public services  
62. Sous-payés 
• Under-payed  
63. Stagnation 
• Stagnation  
64. Système de protection 
• System of protection  
65. TAFTA  
• Free trade agreement between EU 
and US 
66. Tarif 
• Tarif  
67. Taux d'intérêt 
• Interest rates  
68. Travail* 
• Work 
 
Table 12: List of Top Frequently Used Words by JMLP from 2001-2002 Campaign 
Speeches  
Populist Rhetoric 
Exclusionary Populist 
& Xenophobic 
Rhetoric 
Economic Rhetoric 
Anti-Elite Anti-Pluralist 
Appeal to 
People 
Exclusionary 
Populist 
Xenophobic 
General 
Economy 
RWP 
Economic 
1) Financ* 
2) Socialis* 
3) Bruxelles 
4) Américain 
1) National* 
2) Nationalité 
3) Souverain* 
4) Valeur* 
1) Responsabilité 
2) Référend* 
1) Étrang* 
2) Sécurité 
3) Immigré* 
4) Interdi* 
1) Terror* 
2) Fondamental* 
3) Danger  
4) Islam* 
1) Econom* 
2) Chôm* 
3) Développ* 
4) Retraite 
1) Agric* 
2) Rétabl* 
3) Mondialilsation  
4) Global 
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5) Banq*; banc* 
6) Corruption 
7) Syndicat* 
8) Bureaucra* 
9) Client* 
10) Multination* 
5) Cultur* 
6) Défend* 
7) Démocrat* 
8) Femme* 
9) Justice 
10) Patriot* 
 
5) Préférence 
6) Lutt* 
7) Pacifi* 
8) Combatt* 
9) Immigration 
10) Priorité 
5) Musulman* 
6) Insécurité 
7) Attaque* 
8) Attentat*  
9) Violence 
10) Africain* 
5) Entrepr* 
6) Fisc* 
7) Croissance 
8) Réform* 
9) Concurrence 
10) Chiffre* 
5) Libéralis* 
6) Reconqu* 
 
 
Table 13: List of Top Frequently Used Words by JMLP from 2006-2007 Campaign 
Speeches  
Populist Rhetoric 
Exclusionary Populist 
& Xenophobic 
Rhetoric 
Economic Rhetoric 
Anti-Elite 
Anti-
Pluralist 
Appeal to 
People 
Exclusionary 
Populist 
Xenophobic 
General 
Economy 
RWP 
Economic 
1) Financ* 
2) Sarkozy 
3) Bruxelles 
4) Syndica* 
5) Socialis* 
6) Administrat* 
7) Banc*/banq* 
8) Monopol* 
9) Multination* 
10) Américain 
11) Ultra-libér* 
 
1) National* 
2) Valeur* 
3) Justice 
4) Souverain* 
5) Défend* 
6) Femme* 
7) Patriot* 
8) Nationalité 
9) Protection 
10) Cultur* 
11) Démocrat* 
 
1) Responsabilité 
2) Référend* 
3) Populis* 
 
1) Étrang* 
2) Sécurité 
3) Immigré* 
4) Lutt* 
5) Préférence 
6) Combatt* 
7) Interdi* 
8) Immigration  
9) Criminel 
10) Pacifi* 
1) Fondamental* 
2) Insécurité 
3) Musulman* 
4) Terror* 
5) Violence 
6) Danger 
7) Arabe* 
8) Agression* 
9) Juif* 
10) Beur* 
1) Econom* 
2) Entrepr* 
3) Chôm* 
4) Retraite 
5) Développ* 
6) Fisc* 
7) Réform* 
8) Chiffr* 
9)  Dette 
10)  Dépenses 
1) Agric* 
2) Mondialilsation  
3) Rétabl* 
4) Global* 
5) Artisans 
6) Libéralis* 
7) Délocalisation 
8) Reconqu* 
 
 
Table 14: List of Top Frequently Used Words by MLP from 2011-2012 Campaign 
Speeches  
Populist Rhetoric 
Exclusionary 
Populist & 
Xenophobic Rhetoric 
Economic Rhetoric 
Anti-Elite 
Anti-
Pluralist 
Appeal to 
People 
Exclusionary 
Populist 
Xenophobic 
General 
Economy 
RWP Economic 
1) Sarkozy 
2) Financ* 
3) Banc*/banq* 
4) Hollande 
5) Syndicat* 
6) Elite 
7) Socialis* 
8) PS 
9) Bruxelles 
10) UMP 
11) Administrat* 
 
1) National 
2) Défend* 
3) Valeur* 
4) Patriot* 
5) Souverain* 
6) Cultur* 
7) Justice 
8) Identité 
9) Démocrat* 
10) Protection 
1) Responsabilité 
2) Référend* 
3) Populis* 
 
1) Etrang* 
2) Immigration 
3) Sécurité 
4) Lutt* 
5) Interd* 
6) Combatt* 
7) Priorité 
8) Immigré 
9) Criminal 
10) Délinquant 
 
1) Insécurité 
2) Islam* 
3) Violence 
4) Fondamental* 
5) Musulman* 
6) Agression* 
7) Terror* 
8) Attaque 
9) Récidivist* 
10) Mosquée* 
1) Econom* 
2) Entrepris* 
3) Chôm* 
4) Euro 
5) Concurrence 
6) Dette 
7) Monnaie 
8) Fiscal* 
9) Règle 
10) Développ* 
1) Agricol* 
2) Mondialisation 
3) Rétabl* 
4) Artisans 
5) Liberalis* 
6) OMC 
7) Reindustrialisation 
8) Délocalisation 
9) Global 
10) Reconqu* 
 
Table 15: List of Top Frequently Used Words by MLP from 2016-2017 Campaign 
Speeches  
Populist Rhetoric 
Exclusionary 
Populist & 
Xenophobic Rhetoric 
Economic Rhetoric 
Anti-Elite Anti-Pluralist 
Appeal to 
People 
Exclusionary 
Populist 
Xenophobic 
General 
Economy 
RWP Economic 
1) Financ*  1) National* 1) Responsabilité 1) Sécurité 1) Islam* 1) Econom* 1) Agric* 
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2) Banc*/banq* 
3) Administrat* 
4) Hollande 
5) Bruxelles 
6) Multination* 
7) Client* 
8) Sarkozy 
9) Ps 
10) Socialis* 
 
2) Patriot* 
3) Cultur* 
4) Démocrat* 
5) Défend* 
6) Souverain* 
7) Protection 
8) Identité 
9) Communaut
arisme 
10) Justice 
 
2) Référend* 
 
2) Immigration 
3) Etrang* 
4) Lutt* 
5) Interd* 
6) Migrant* 
7) Priorité 
8) Apaisée 
9) Combatt* 
10) Frontière 
 
2) Terror* 
3) Fondamental* 
4) Insécurité 
5) Attaque* 
6) Musulman* 
7) Attentat* 
8) Mosqué* 
9) Violence 
2) Entrepr* 
3) Chôm* 
4) Developp* 
5) Emploi 
6) Fiscal* 
7) Euro 
8) Concurrence 
9) Impôt 
10) Dette 
2) Mondialisation 
3) Retabl* 
4) Global* 
5) Reconqu* 
6) Artisans 
7) Liberalis* 
8) Réindustrialisation 
9) Délocalisation 
 
Table 16: Analysis Raw Numbers 
Campaign 
JMLP 2001-
2002 
JMLP 2006-
2007 
MLP 2011-
2012 
MLP 2016-
2017 
Number & 
Percentage 
N % N % N % N % 
Populist 
Rhetoric 
704 42.37% 1443 44.95% 1714 52.41% 1991 40.36% 
Xenophobic 
Rhetoric 
441 26.54% 591 18.41% 582 17.79% 1293 26.21% 
Economic 
Rhetoric 
516 31.05% 1176 36.63% 974 29.78% 1648 33.41% 
 
Campaign 
JMLP 2001-
2002 
JMLP 2006-
2007 
MLP 2011-
2012 
MLP 2016-
2017 
Number & 
Percentage 
N % N % N % N % 
Anti-Elite 
 
197 11.86% 555 17.28% 813 24.86% 557 11.29% 
Anti-Pluralist 
 
481 28.95% 823 25.63% 862 26.36% 1352 27.41% 
Appeal to 
People 
26 1.56% 65 2.02% 39 1.19% 82 1.66% 
Exclusionary 
Populism 
261 15.71% 444 13.81% 348 10.64% 699 14.17% 
Overt 
Xenophobia 
180 10.83% 147 4.57% 234 7.15% 594 12.04% 
General 
Economy 
426 25.64% 931 29.00% 760 23.24% 1378 27.93% 
Far Right-
Wing Populist 
90 5.41% 245 7.63% 214 6.54% 270 5.47% 
 
